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I. INTRODUCTION
To the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the In-
temet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on
the physical layer of the Internet.' The question has been whether Internet ser-
vice providers should be considered "essential facilities" or "natural monopo-
lies" and therefore regulated as public utilities.2 Such concerns served to drive
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I See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 211-13 (2005) (outlining
the economic considerations underlying the FCC's 1998 decision not to apply public utility
regulation to applications riding on top of the physical layer of the Internet); Randolph J.
May, Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works: An Essay on the Need for a New Mar-
ket-Oriented Communications Policy, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 107, 111-12 (2006) (arguing
that regulation of the physical layer of the Internet could "stultify the continued evolution"
of the network); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, I J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 37, 60 (2002) (explaining that most communications regulation is directed
at the physical layer of the Internet because "it has historically been viewed a natural mo-
nopoly").
2 See, e.g., Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 585-86 (2007) (explaining that Internet
access is arguably a good example of natural monopoly because deploying the infrastructure
requires such high upfront costs, making market entry challenging, while the "incremental"
costs of running the infrastructure are low); see Davina Sashkin, Comment, Failure of Imag-
ination: Why Inaction on Net Neutrality Regulation Will Result in a de Facto Legal Regime
Promoting Discrimination and Consumer Harn, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 289
(2006) (reasoning that because most people access the Internet through a single provider,
that provider has a monopoly over the consumer's online experience; and further, because
the majority of United States markets have two or fewer broadband providers, "those pro-
viders control an essential facility through which consumers access [online] content"); see
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the debate over "net neutrality" regulation.3
While the net neutrality debate rages on, the rhetoric of "public utilities" and
"essential facilities" is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about oth-
er layers of the Internet, such as the search layer.4 More recently, academic and
public policy circles are discussing whether social media platforms-
especially social networking sites-might also possess public utility character-
istics.5 Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of
those sites' structures and business practices.
Proponents of a public utility regulatory regime for social media platforms
offer a variety of justifications for this approach. Amorphous "fairness" con-
cerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational harms are also
frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation.6 Proponents of regulation
also sometimes invoke "social utility" or "social commons" arguments in de-
fense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear
definition.7
However, social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities,
and there are good reasons for why policymakers should avoid a rush to regu-
late them as such. Treating these nascent digital services as regulated utilities
would harm consumer welfare because public utility regulation has traditional-
ly been the archenemy of innovation and competition.' Furthermore, treating
also Marissa A. Piropato, Comment, Open Access and the Essential Facilities Doctrine:
Promoting Competition and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 369, 380 (2000).
3 See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 1-2, 219-
221 (2010) (defining "net neutrality" as a "rule that would prevent network providers from
blocking independent applications, content, or portals" through the use of "discriminatory
technology").
4 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1291-92
(2007) ("Nonetheless, it is possible for applications to become exclusive platforms with
anti-competitive effects similar to those of exclusive physical broadband networks.
Google's dominant search engine and MySpace's massive social networking site might be
candidates for such scrutiny at some point in the future.").
5 See, e.g., Ambrose Thompson, Social Media as Public Expectation: The New Public
Utility, N.Y. PUB. LIBR. (June 30, 2010), http://commcns.org/I7T7nvb (arguing that social
media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and Linkedln are an "essential commodity" in an in-
terconnected world and, therefore, satisfy the definition of a public utility).
6 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1175 (2008); Philip N.
Howard, Let's Nationalize Facebook, SLATE (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:07 AM),
http://commcns.org/15kgLcq (proposing to nationalize Facebook, or regulate it as a public
utility, in hopes of making the company more responsive to users' privacy rights and expec-
tations).
7 See, e.g., danah boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, ZEPHORIA (Mar.
15, 2010), http://commcns.org/140YsZF.
8 See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548 (1969) (arguing that a public utility's rate of innovation may be "suboptimal" un-
less the regulatory payoff is quite high, and also that general innovation may be stronger in a
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today's leading social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to
convert natural monopoly or essential facility claims into self-fulfilling proph-
ecies. Related proposals to mandate "API neutrality"9 or enforce a "Separations
Principle"' ° on integrated information platforms would be particularly prob-
lematic because such regulation threatens innovation and investment." Mar-
ketplace experimentation in search of sustainable business models should not
be made illegal.
Remedies less onerous than regulation are available. Transparency and data-
portability policies would solve many of the problems that concern critics, and
numerous private empowerment solutions exist for those users concerned
about their privacy on social media sites. Finally, because social media are
fundamentally tied up with the production and dissemination of speech and
expression, First Amendment values are at stake, warranting heightened consti-
tutional scrutiny of proposals for regulation. Social media providers should
retain the editorial discretion to determine how their platforms are configured
and what can appear on them.
competitive market as opposed to one with a natural monopoly).
9 "API" (or application programming interface) refers to the method by which applica-
tions and programs "communicate with and draw functionality from a given website or ser-
vice." The API for an Internet platform can be open or closed. If an API is closed, its users
can only interact with the website or service directly, while "sites with more open API allow
users to interact with the website using other sites or applications created by third parties."
Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel "Neutrality" Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable
Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537, 572-73 (2011). Proponents of
API neutrality take issue with platform providers that seek to cut off third-party interaction
with their interfaces. Professor Jonathan Zittrain, for instance, has suggested that certain
social networking sites might be required to maintain open interfaces. See JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 184-85 (2008) ("Those who
offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain
application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who have built on top of
their interfaces can continue to do so on equal terms.").
10 The so-called "Separations Principle" is Professor Tim Wu's "constitutional ap-
proach" to our modem information economy. Modeled after the separation of powers in the
American government, the regime aims to "constrain and divide all power that derives from
the control of information" such that "those who develop information, those who own the
network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of ac-
cess must be kept apart from one another." Additionally, Wu emphasizes that government
must keep its distance because such interference is ultimately destructive to the information
market. TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 304-
05(2010).
11 Marissa A. Piropato, supra note 2, at 405-06; see, e.g., Internet Access and the Con-
sumer: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transport., 106th Cong. 35
(1999) (statement of James 0. Robbins, President, Cox Communications) ("The mere sug-
gestion from Government that such risky investments could be subjected to old-fashioned
cost-of-service regulation would have a chilling effect on going-forward investments and
would slow the roll-out of these new advanced Internet services.").
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II. RISING CALLS FOR THE REGULATION OF A NEW MEDIUM
A. "Search Neutrality" and "Net Neutrality" as a Prelude to Broader Debate
Are social networking sites such as Facebook, Linkedln, and Twitter "in-
formation monopolies" that should be regulated as public utilities? What about
other social media and digital application platforms like Amazon, Apple, and
Google? Should "neutrality" mandates be imposed upon these sites, services,
or devices?
With attention focused on the physical layers of the Internet,2 these applica-
tion-layer service providers have not received much regulatory consideration
from the public utility perspective." The underlying question has been whether
Internet service providers should be considered "essential facilities" or "natural
monopolies" and be regulated accordingly. 4 The debate over "net neutrality"
regulation has been animated by such concerns.'5 Andrew Odlyzko, a Universi-
ty of Minnesota mathematics professor, argues that the underlying issue in the
net neutrality debate-the "conflict between society's drives for economic ef-
ficiency and for fairness"--will likely continue in other layers of the Internet.'6
Odlyzko predicts, "There is no reason to expect that this conflict will lessen,
and instead there are arguments that suggest it will intensify. Should something
like net neutrality prevail, the conflict would likely move to a different level.
That level might become search neutrality."' 7
Indeed, as search giant Google has grown larger in recent years, some in ac-
ademia suggest that we may need "search neutrality" regulation modeled after
net neutrality regulation, and that "such concerns will ultimately warrant crea-
tion of a Federal Search Commission" to enforce such a regime.'8 Similarly,
12 Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications for the Digital
Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 74 (2005).
3 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 1, at 211.
14 Robert A. Penchuk, Comment, Unleashing the Open Mobile Internet, 10 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 74, 81 (2009); see James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Inter-
connection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 252 (2002).
15 See VAN SCHEWICK,supra note 3, at 219-21.
16 Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-ending Con-
flict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REv. NETWORK ECON. 40, 41 (2009).
17 Id.
18 Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Car-
riers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 276-99 (arguing that "ultimately
[I]nternet nondiscrimination principles should be applied equally to dominant players,
whether search engines or carriers"); see Competition on the Internet: Hearing Before the
Task Force on Competition Policy & Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 48 (2008) (statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor, Seton Hall Law School);
see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed., Business World: Sort of Evil, WALL ST. J., July 18,
2007, at A14 ("Google's ... dominance in search and advertising . . . [and i]ts ability to
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other legal scholars have advocated a more expansive view of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that would permit more robust regulation to prohibit "dom-
inant search engines ... from manipulating search results on an individualized
basis and ... require them to provide political candidates with meaningful,
uncensored access to forums for communicating with the public." 9
While no federal agency has acted on these calls, there have been hints of
interest. In a 2009 Notice of Inquiry on wireless innovation, the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC") asked,
[C]an a [company's] dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive
issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be
necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to
promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications
and services? 0
This inquiry preceded the FCC's push to impose net neutrality mandates on
wireline broadband platforms and could foreshadow a broader regulatory push
to come.' The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is also expanding its inter-
est in this arena.22
B. Generic Calls for Public Utility-Style Regulation of Social Media
Calls for public utility-style regulation of social media platforms are grow-
ing, and the rationales for regulation vary, ranging from traditional economic
concerns to more amorphous social and cultural concerns.23 While varying in
control which Web sites and Web businesses receive traffic makes it a far likelier candidate
for 'public utility' treatment than the diverse and growing array of players who make up the
broadband world.").
19 DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE
INTERNET AGE 151 (2009).
20 In re Fostering Innovation and Investment in the Wireless Communications Market;
A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Notice of Inquiry, 24 F.C.C.R. 11,322, 60
(Aug. 27, 2009).
21 See In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and
Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 1 (Dec. 21, 2010).
22 In June 2007, the FTC concluded a yearlong inquiry into net neutrality issues and
decided to adopt an essentially deregulatory wait-and-see approach. Equally significant was
the agency's assertion of authority to regulate broadband providers if and when it ever
changes its mind. See FTC, STAFF REPORT: BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLI-
cy 38 (2007), available at http://commcns.org/156XmaS ("[B]ecause most broadband In-
ternet access services are not provided on a common carrier basis, they are part of the larger
economy subject to the FTC's general competition and consumer protection authority with
regard to methods, acts, or practices in or affecting commerce."); see also Sara Jerome, FTC
Head Endorses Net-Neutrality Rules, HILLICON VALLEY (Dec. 15, 2010, 11:39 AM),
http://commcns.org/l56XA I v.
23 Howard, supra note 6 (insisting that Facebook be nationalized to "fix the company's
woeful privacy practices, allow the social network to fulfill its true potential for providing
social good, and force it to put its valuable data to work on significant social problems");
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rationale, these pronouncements all come to the same conclusion. A columnist
recently argued that "[s]ocial networks are a critical layer of infrastructure for a
wide variety of applications and content," and claimed that users may get
locked into some online services without "social network neutrality."2 Another
opinion piece further argues that, "[f]or new media to be potential equalizers,
they must be treated as public utilities, recognizing that spectrum abundance
(the excuse for privatization) does not prevent monopoly ownership of hard-
ware and software platforms and hence cannot guarantee equal civic, educa-
tional and cultural access to citizens. 25
Social media researcher danah boyd contends that Facebook is acquiring
public utility characteristics and suggests that regulation may be in its future.26
"Facebook may not be at the scale of the Internet (or the Internet at the scale of
electricity), but that doesn't mean that it's not angling to be a utility or quickly
becoming one," she writes.27 Thus, boyd regards regulation as inevitable: "We
can argue about whether or not regulation makes things cheaper or more ex-
pensive, but we can't argue about whether or not regulators are involved with
utilities: they are always watching them because they matter to the people. 28
Zeynep Tufekci, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, argues that, "many such services are natural monopolies: Google,
Ebay [sic], Facebook, Amazon, all benefit greatly from network externalities
which means that the more people on the service, the more useful it is for eve-
ryone."29 She worries about Facebook and Google, in particular, causing a
"corporatization of social commons""0 and about the danger of the "privatiza-
tion of our publics. 31
The works of Tufekci and boyd are representative of the way that many aca-
demics and Internet policy pundits increasingly speak of larger social network-
ing sites as the equivalent of "social utilities" or "social commons," and claim
that such sites are essential to one's social existence. Indeed, going beyond
characterizing social networking sites as mere commons, there are those who
see, e.g., boyd, supra note 7.
24 Jake Levine, It's Time for a Social Network Neutrality, Bus. INSIDER (July 18, 2011,
10:12 AM), http://commcns.org/14Pe3by.
25 See Benjamin R. Barber, Toward a Fighting Liberalism, NATION, Nov. 7, 2011 , at 20,
23, available at http://commcns.org/I ddalwb.
26 We respectfully honor the wishes of danah boyd that her name remain in lowercase
for all official publications. See boyd, supra note 7.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Zeynep Tufekci, Google Buzz: The Corporatization of Social Commons, TECHNOSO-
CIOLOGY (Feb. 17, 2010), http://commcns.org/14PACNd.
30 Id.
31 Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook: The Privatization of Our Privates and Life in the Com-
pany Town, TECHNOSOCIOLOGY (May 14, 2010), http://commcns.org/15kO3rV.
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suggest that we should begin to think of Facebook and Google as nation-states
or "sovereigns" of cyberspace. 2 In these scholar's views, it is seemingly one's
civic duty to participate in these online services because "[p]resence on the
Internet is effectively a requirement for fully and effectively participating in
the [twenty-first] century as a citizen, as a consumer, as an informed person[,]
and as a social being."33
Privacy concerns provoked many of these critics to claim that utility-like
regulation may be necessary, not so much to satisfy traditional economic or
equity rationales like affordability and universal service, but to achieve various
social policy objectives, such as the protection of user privacy. 4
Others worry about long-term reputational harm, and call for a variety of in-
creased intermediary policing responsibilities or regulations, including a "Fair
Reputation Reporting Act."3 Building on proposals to increase search engine
regulation, Frank Pasquale has called for search engines to provide the equiva-
lent of a "right of reply" for information that users find about themselves
online but consider inaccurate or defamatory-a sort of "Internet Fairness
Doctrine." 6 At the search layer, it is suggested that, "Google could set up a
panel of neutral arbitrators who would evaluate claims by private individuals
that Google is returning search results that might constitute tortious or digni-
tary harms."37 Failure by Google (and presumably other search providers as
well) to evaluate the claim or take action would open the company to liability
"for its negligence in disseminating tortious material."3 Thus, in addition to
public utility obligations, social media platforms might be subjected to greater
tort liability.
Such concerns about online reputation, especially regarding children, have
also motivated federal legislative efforts to establish some social media regula-
tion. In May 2011, Reps. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) and Joe Barton (R-Texas)
32 REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE
FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 150-51, 165 (2012); see LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO You ARE
AND I SAW WHAT You DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 1-2, 13-14
(2012).
33 Tufekci, Google Buzz, supra note 29.
34 Tufekci, Facebook, supra note 31.
35 See Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clan-
destinely Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND
REPUTATION 107, 113 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
36 Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 68-69 (2008) (discussing how the Internet Fairness Doctrine would allow
regulatory agencies the ability to compel directories and search engines to catalog websites
using objective criteria, hence guaranteeing that users are directed to websites not based on
commercial relationships, but on their likely benefit to the user).
37 Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET, supra note 35, at 155, 170.
38 Id. at 171.
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introduced H.R. 1895, the Do Not Track Kids Act of 201 L" Their legislation
would expand the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COP-
PA"), which requires websites that are directed or targeted towards children
under the age of thirteen, to have significant privacy safeguards in place.40 The
Markey-Barton bill would also apply Fair Information Practice Principles
("FIPPS") to teenagers via a "Digital Marketing Bill of Rights for Teens" and
impose limits on the collection of geolocation information (such as country,
city, zip code, time zone, latitude, and longitude) from both children and
teens."' Finally, the measure would mandate that social media sites offer con-
sumers "Eraser Buttons," " a concept modeled loosely on an idea be-
ing considered in the European Union, the so-called "right to be forgotten"
online.43 Specifically, the Markey-Barton bill would require online operators
"to the extent technologically feasible, to implement mechanisms that permit
users of the website, service, or application of the operator to erase or other-
wise eliminate content that is publicly available through the website, service,
or application and contains or displays personal information of children or mi-
nors .... ."" In theory, eraser buttons would help minors wipe out embarrassing
facts that they have placed online but later come to regret.45 However, the pro-
posal also raises many serious free speech issues because it is tantamount to a
form of digital censorship and also threatens press freedoms.46
39 Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011); see Press Release,
Rep. Ed Markey, May 13, 2011: Markey, Barton Introduce Bipartisan "Do Not Track Kids
Act" (May 13, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/l 7buov4.
40 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2006); see generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Pri-
vacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress &
Freedom Found., Wash., D.C.), June 2009, available at http://commcns.org/17cLn0j (dis-
cussing earlier efforts to expand COPPA's regulatory framework on the state level).
41 H.R. 1895, §§ 5-6; see Press Release, Rep. Ed Markey, supra note 39.
42 H.R. 1895, § 7; see Press Release, Rep. Ed Markey, supra note 39.
43 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 51-53, COM (2012) 11
final (Jan. 25, 2011) (providing for an individual right to have personal data deleted by a
data processor and third parties it has shared the data with when it is no longer necessary,
where consent has been withdrawn, or if data is used contrary to the European Commis-
sion's privacy regulation); see also Adam Thierer, Erasing Our Past on the Internet,
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://commcns.org/17essjR (discussing the inherent
constitutional and enforcement issues raised by a mandatory "right to be forgotten" or
"Eraser Button"); Larry Downes, Europe Reimagines Orwell's Memory Hole, TECH. LIBER-
ATION FRONT (Nov. 16, 2010), http://commcns.org/I dg5i3D (emphasizing the breadth of the
proposed "right to be forgotten" and warning colloquially that the devil is in the details).
" H.R. 1895, § 7(b)(l)(A).
45 Adam Thierer, Initial Thoughts About the Markey-Barton "Do Not Track Kids" Bill,
TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (May 6, 2011), http://commcns.org/ I8Txqnf.
46 Adam Thierer, Kids, Privacy, Free Speech and the Internet: Finding the Right Bal-
[Vol. 21
Perils of Social Media as Public Utilities
Twitter is also coming under scrutiny as it becomes an increasingly vibrant
social media platform. In mid-2011, the FTC announced that it was investigat-
ing how Twitter interacts with the companies building applications and ser-
vices for its platform.47 The agency reached out to competing application and
platform providers to ask questions about Twitter's recent efforts to exert more
control over third-party uses of its application programming interface ("API"),
the code vocabulary that programs use to communicate with one another." It
remains to be seen whether the FTC's investigation will lead to any regulatory
action against Twitter, but the Commission seems to believe that Twitter has
some degree of market power in its emerging, presently undefined market sec-
tor.
49
The FTC's investigation concerns the alleged threat of exclusionary busi-
ness practices posed by Twitter exerting greater control over its API,"0 but an-
other potential flashpoint in this debate involves Twitter's management of
"hashtags" and "trends." Twitter users can easily follow their favorite or trend-
ing topics by using subject-specific hashtags, such as "#taxes" or
"#freespeech."' This feature makes Twitter a freewheeling forum that allows
instantaneous debate and commentary about virtually every subject under the
sun. Occasionally, however, accusations of "hashtag censorship" or "trend
censorship" are let loose if users of a particular hashtag believe that it should
be higher in the Twitter Trends ranks.52 Twitter Trends, which are algorithmi-
cally generated by Twitter, identify popular topics that are being discussed on
Twitter at a given point in time, more so than they were previously. 3 For ex-
ance 7 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-32, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/l6yMh2P.
47 Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2011),
http://commcns.org/l 6IFg2U.
48 Id.; see NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 131 (25th ed. 2009) (defining "API" as "a
set of standard software interrupts, calls, and data formats that application programs use to
initiate contact with network services, mainframe communications programs, telephone
equipment or program-to-program communications.").
49 Adam Thierer, Twitter, the Monopolist? Is This Tim Wu 's "Threat Regime" in Ac-
tion?, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (July 1, 2011), http://commcns.org/l61Ggnr (discussing the
FTC's more aggressive approach towards Internet companies and how, in antitrust enforce-
ment actions, the market in question must be defined to show market power).
50 Jeff Bliss & Brian Womack, FTC Begins Twitter Antitrust Inquiry, BLOOMBERG (July
1,2011, 2:36 PM), http://commcns.org/l 9SUuHk.
51 See Lorien Roux, Using Twitter Hashtags for Your Small Business, HASHTAGS.ORG
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://commcns.org/19SUx5Y.
52 See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, Twitter Says It's Not Censoring Occupy Wall Street-
People Really Are More Concerned With Doritos Right Now, BETABEAT (Sept. 26, 2011,
3:18 PM), http://commcns.org/13QEPpb (discussing claims made by Occupy Wall Street
protestors that Twitter was censoring tweets related to the protest movement).
53 To Trend or Not to Trend..., TwiTER (Dec. 8, 2010), http://commcns.org/Ic6DPgN
("Twitter Trends are automatically generated by an algorithm that attempts to identify topics
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ample, users voiced such complaints when hotly debating WikiLeaks and the
Occupy Wall Street movement. 4 The topics' respective hashtags (#wikileaks
and #occupywallstreet or #OWS) were often trending, but were not always
leading the Trends list.5
Cornell University communications professor Tarleton Gillespie worries
about "the specter of censorship" at Twitter through "algorithmic interven-
tion." 6 He predicts,
[T]he debate about tools like Twitter Trends is, I believe, a debate we will be having
more and more often. As more and more of our online public discourse takes place on
a select set of private content platforms and communication networks, and these pro-
viders turn to complex algorithms to manage, curate, and organize these massive col-
lections, there is an important tension emerging between what we expect these algo-
rithms to be, and what they in fact are. Not only must we recognize that these algo-
rithms are not neutral, and that they encode political choices, and that they frame in-
formation in a particular way. We must also understand what it means that we are
coming to rely on these algorithms, that we want them to be neutral, we want them to
be reliable, we want them to be the effective ways in which we come to know what is
most important. 7
As with search results, we will likely see a push for "algorithmic neutrality"
and a resurrection of the long-standing debate over editorial discretion and the
First Amendment rights of platform owners. Search engines frequently
claim-and users mistakenly believe-that algorithms are already perfectly
neutral and rank data using a strict scientific or mathematical calculus devoid
of any human intervention." In reality, every search provider and social media
platform service uses a mix of automated and human elements. 9 Digital plat-
form owners often tweak algorithms to ensure more relevant results and to
prevent spammers and scammers from "gaming" the algorithm." The contro-
versy will likely continue because, as Gillespie notes, "we want so badly for
these tools to perform a simple, neutral calculus, without blurry edges, without
human intervention, without having to be tweaked to get it 'right,' without be-
that are being talked about more right now than they were previously .... The Trends list
captures the hottest emerging topics, not just what's most popular.").
54 Jeffries, supra note 52.
55 Id.
56 See Tarleton Gillespie, Can an Algorithm Be Wrong? Twitter Trends, the Specter of
Censorship, and our Faith in the Algorithms Around Us, SOC. MEDIA COLLECTIVE (Oct. 19,
2011), http://commcns.org/l7VQtvW.
57 Id.
58 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism,
in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 461, 461-62 (Berin
Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010).
59 See id. at 462-65 (explaining that, although search engines typically automate their
core operations, they "make editorial judgments just like any other media company").
60 See, e.g., Optimizing Your Website for Search Engines and Directories, VERIO,
http://commcns.org/16IJMyh (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
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ing shaped by the interests of their providers."'"
C: Wu's "Separations Principle" for "Information Monopolies"
Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu has prompted much of the recent
angst over the growing scale of some social media and online service provid-
ers. In his recent works The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information
Empires and In the Grip of the New Monopolists, Wu argues that "information
monopolies" are on the rise, and the current "laissez-faire approach" towards
them is no longer feasible. 2 Wu's list of "information monopolists" includes
Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. 3
Wu makes several provocative assertions in his work. First, he uses ex-
tremely expansive constructions of "information monopoly." According to
Wu, because "information industries ... can never be properly understood as
'normal' industries,"65 traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust laws,
"are inadequate for the regulation of information industries."' Wu believes that
because information industries "traffic in forms of individual expression" and
are "fundamental to democracy," they require differential regulatory treat-
ment.67 His argument contradicts the thrust of the First Amendment, which tra-
ditionally has imposed a higher level of legal scrutiny on content-focused regu-
latory efforts.68
Second, running counter to the thrust of most modem antitrust analysis, Wu
61 Gillespie, supra note 56.
62 Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://commcns.org/19SWPBV; see Wu, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 303-04.
63 See Wu, New Monopolists, supra note 62.
64 See Wu, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 302 ("[Ilnformation industries are collec-
tively embedded in our existence in a way unprecedented in industrial history, involving
every dimension of our national and personal lives-economic, yes, but also expressive and
cultural, social and political.").
65 Id. at 301-02 (discussing how information monopolies use speech as their commodity
and thus combine economic and political power).
66 Id. at 303.
67 Id. at 301-04.
68 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-58 (1974) (providing no
statutory right of reply to newspaper articles because it compels speech by interfering with
editorial independence); Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Hudson, 667 F.3d 630, 638 (5th Cir.
2012) ("Laws singling out a small number of speakers for onerous treatment are inherently
suspect"); see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our precedents
thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content."). But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386-390 (1969) (justifying the application of intermediate scrutiny for
broadcast media due to "the scarcity of radio frequencies"). Wu argues that these infor-
mation monopolies have political power because of the content they possess, see Wu, MAS-
TER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 302-03, so it could be argued that these monopolists are re-
ceiving differential treatment because of the content they possess.
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is generally far more concerned with vertical integration than horizontal, refer-
ring to "the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power" in information
sectors.69 This concern leads to his advocacy for a so-called "Separations Prin-
ciple" for the information economy," which would segregate information pro-
viders into three buckets: content creators, distributors, and hardware makers.7
Wu says this remedy:
[1]s not a regulatory approach but rather a constitutional approach to the information
economy. By that I mean a regime whose goal is to constrain and divide all power
that derives from the control of information .... A Separations Principle would mean
the creation of a salutary distance between each of the major functions or layers in the
information economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who
own the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or
venues of access must be kept apart from one another.
72
Wu calls this a "constitutional approach" because he models it on the separa-
tion of powers found in the United States Constitution, even though the Consti-
tution focused on constraining the powers of government, not businesses.73
Wu's proposal is relevant to the discussion of treating social media like pub-
lic utilities because it is a variant of structural separation, a rarely used but
sweeping antitrust remedy. 4 Structural separation is the nuclear option of anti-
trust and usually reserved for the most extreme cases of entrenched monopo-
ly.75 The primary recent example is the 1984 government breakup of the Bell
system, which had a comprehensive, nationwide, government-sheltered tele-
phone monopoly.76 AT&T was forced to shed its local telephone-exchange fa-
69 WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 305, 311-12 ("Here, the priorities must be
both the prevention and dissolution of large-scale vertical mergers in the communications
industry .... ).
70 Id. at 304-05.
71 Id. at 304.
72 Id. at 304-05 (emphasis in original).
73 Id.
74 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 650a, 653b) ("[S]tructural relief, which is 'de-
signed to eliminate the monopoly altogether ... require[s] a clearer indication of a signifi-
cant causal connection between the conduct and creation or maintenance of the market
power.' Absent such causation, the antitrust defendant's unlawful behavior should be reme-
died by 'an injunction against continuation of that conduct"'); see United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (labeling divesture as the "most drastic,
but most effective" antitrust remedy); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 155-58 (2008)
withdrawn as agency policy Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department With-
draws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at
http://commcns.org/1 7d6M9t.
75 See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 at 106.
76 Adam Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the
Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 267, 269-70 (1994), available at
http://commcns.org/IdG70ZN; see United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
151-52 & n.85 (D.D.C. 1982) (describing AT&T as "the largest corporation in the world by
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cilities, which became seven independent regional operators.77 Although Wu is
short on details about how his "Separations Principle" for the information
economy would be implemented,"8 presumably it would entail a similar disin-
tegration and reordering of social media operations.
Incidentally, Wu was named a senior advisor to the FTC in early 2011, just
before the agency announced an investigation into Twitter's business practic-
es.79 The Twitter case comes on the heels of FTC investigations into the busi-
ness practices of both Apple and Google.8" Antitrust interest in Google's busi-
ness practices increased following the January 2012 launch of "Search, plus
Your World," the company's attempt to personalize search results.' Some crit-
ics protested the move on privacy grounds,82 while others-including rivals
like Twitter-accused Google of unfairly favoring its own social service over
those of its competitors. 3 The FTC promptly announced that it was expanding
its antitrust probe of the company to include these concerns.84
D. "API Neutrality" for App Platforms
In his book The Future of the Internet-And How to Stop It, Harvard Uni-
versity cyberlaw professor Jonathan Zittrain suggests that we might need "API
any reckoning").
77 See RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULA-
TION IN AMERICA 211 (1994).
78 See Wu, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 309, 313 (suggesting implementation
through an "informal compact between the people and their government" or through self-
regulation by the information industry).
79 Nicholas Carlson & Dan Frommer, Twitter Is Under Federal Investigation, Bus.
INSIDER (June 30, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://commcns.org/174cZ9z (five months after Wu
joined the agency); see Spencer E. Ante & Thomas Catan, Columbia Law's Tim Wu to Ad-
vise FTC, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://commcns.org/l dgzdZw.
80 Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, The Federal Trade Commission Penalizes
Google for Being Successful, FORBES (June 28, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://commcns.org/I 5a3kYD; see Thomas Catan, Apple's Mobile Rules To Get FTC Scru-
tiny, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2010), http://commcns.org/ldG8hjq. Recall that Apple, Google,
and Twitter are three of the many companies that Wu labels "information monopolies" or
"information empires" in his work. Wu, New Monopolists, supra note 62.
81 Ian Paul, Google's Search Plus Your World: What it Means for Users, PCWORLD
(Jan. II, 2012, 6:56 AM), http://commcns.org/laFyQpm; see Sara Forden & Brian Wom-
ack, FTC Said to Expand Antitrust Probe of Google to Social Networking Service, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://commcns.org/I 3QVvN9.
82 Jessica Guynn, Google likely to face FTC complaint over 'Search Plus Your World,'
L.A. TIMES (Jan. II, 2012, 10:14 AM), http://commcns.org/14SuuUr; see, e.g., Letter from
Mark Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, et al. (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/l 8dzkNe.
83 Farhad Manjoo, I'm Not Here to Make Friends, SLATE (Jan. 11, 2012, 6:02 PM),
http://commcns.org/14110X5; see Tim Carmody, Dirty Little Secrets: The Trouble with So-
cial Search, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2012, 6:28 PM), http://commcns.org/174eYLb.
84 See Forden & Womack, supra note 81.
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neutrality" to ensure fair access to certain online services or digital platforms."5
Although he does not label it as such, API neutrality assumes that the platform
or device is a sort of public utility or common carrier.86
Zittrain is concerned that the absence of API neutrality could imperil "gen-
erativity," technologies or networks that invite or allow tinkering and all sorts
of creative secondary uses. 7 Primary examples include general-purpose per-
sonal computers ("PCs") and the traditional "best efforts" Internet.8 By con-
trast, Zittrain contemptuously refers to "sterile appliances, tethered to a net-
work of control" or digital technologies or networks that discourage or disal-
low tinkering. 9 Zittrain's primary examples are proprietary devices like Ap-
ple's iPhone, TiVo, or online walled gardens like the old AOL and current cell
phone networks.' Such "tethered" devices or platforms earn Zittrain's wrath.9
He argues that we run the risk of seeing the glorious days of generative devices
and the open Internet give way to those tethered appliances and closed net-
works.92 He fears that most users will flock to tethered appliances in search of
stability or security, and worries that those tethered appliances are less "open"
and more "regulable," thereby allowing easier control by either large corporate
intermediaries or government officials.93 In other words, the "future of the In-
ternet" Zittrain is hoping to "stop" is a world dominated by tethered digital
85 ZirrRAIN, supra note 9, at 181-84.
86 Id. at 183-84 & n.33 (using market power as a triggering effect-which is often used
to justify regulating utilities).
87 See id. at 70-73 (defining the term as "a system's capacity to produce unanticipated
changes through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied audiences," and setting out
the five principal features of a generative system); see also Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Gener-
ative Internet, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1975, 1981 (2006) ("Generativity is a function of a tech-
nology's capacity for leverage across a range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different
tasks, ease of mastery, and accessibility.").
88 The Internet was designed as a network of networks with no guarantee of bandwidth
between one point and another; instead, users are forced to rely on "falling dominos of
trust." In a "best efforts network," you simply "Send it and pray," hoping that a properly
implemented Internet Protocol will make sure every bit of data moves from one end to the
other. ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 33. Zittrain argues, "[t]his same quality is found within
traditional PC architecture. Id. at 69. He continues with an explanation of each "generative
feature" at work in the two systems. See id. at 71-73.
89 Id. at 3-5 (concluding that these tethered devices inhibit the ability of "mainstream
technology [to] be influenced, even revolutionized, out of left field").
90 See id. at 106-07.
91 Id. at 107.
92 See id. at 8 ("Today, the same qualities that led to [the success of the Internet and
general-purpose PCs] are causing [them] to falter. As ubiquitous as Internet technologies are
today, the pieces are in place for a wholesale shift away from the original chaotic design that
has given rise to the modem information revolution.").
93 Id. ("This counterrevolution would push mainstream users away from a generative
Internet that fosters innovation and disruption, to an appliancized network that incorporates
some of the most powerful features of today's Internet while greatly limiting its innovative
capacity-and, for better or worse, heightening its regulability.").
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appliances and walled gardens, because they are too easily controlled by other
actors.
He argues that, "If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the
movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access
that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional
and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering."
Because he fears the rise of "walled gardens" and mediated experiences,95
Zittrain goes on to wonder, "should we consider network neutrality-style man-
dates for appliancized systems?"' He responds to his own question as follows:
The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks to gain the benefits
of third-party contributions while reserving the right to exclude it later .... Those who
offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to re-
main application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on
top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms.97
While many would agree that API neutrality represents a fine generic norm
for online commerce and interactions, Zittrain implies that it should be a legal
standard to which online providers are held.9" He even alludes to the possibility
of applying the common law principle of adverse possession more broadly in
these contexts.99 He notes that adverse possession "dictates that people who
openly occupy another's private property without the owner's explicit objec-
tion (or, for that matter, permission) can, after a lengthy period of time, come
to legitimately acquire it."' He does not make it clear when that principle
would be triggered as it pertains to digital platforms or social media APIs,'0 '
nonetheless, he seemingly believes that API-neutrality gives users a property
right in someone else's API °2 In other words, if someone creates an API and a
user or third-party developer builds something that adds to the underlying ser-
vice (e.g., Twitter or smartphone app stores), API-neutrality dictates that the
user's interest could supersede the rights of the API's owner and the original
developer.
Zittrain's API neutrality proposal would have a profound impact on how so-
cial media and digital application platforms operate. This paper will consider
specific problems with his and Wu's proposals. First, Part III will provide a
94 Id. at 181.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 183.
97 Id. at 183-84.
98 See id. (discussing certain common law doctrines and concluding that they "point to a
deeply held norm that certain consistent behaviors can give rise to obligations, sometimes
despite fine print that tries to prevent those obligations from coming about").
99 See id. at 183.
100 Id.





general sketch of the law and economics of public utility regulation and the
essential facilities doctrine. Part IV will then make a general case against clas-
sifying social media as essential facilities or public utilities.
III. THE BASIC LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
The proposals outlined in Part II make it clear that many of the regulatory
concepts and mechanisms of the past century-public utility mandates, com-
mon carriage regulations, "neutrality" rules, and even the Fairness Doctrine or
"right of reply" mandates-could soon be applied to the Internet and other dig-
ital platforms. While some of these proposals will be premised on amorphous
social concems, such as privacy and reputation, references to traditional pub-
lic-utility and essential-facility rationales for regulation likewise animate the
discussion. As it has been argued, "Access to technological standards, software
platforms, and interconnection information is the [twenty-first] century equiva-
lent of the bridges, roads, and ports that gave rise to the essential facilities doc-
trine in the first place.' ' 3
To explain why it would be misguided to apply such designations to social
media sites, this section offers a brief sketch of the basic law and economics of
essential facilities doctrine and public utility regulation.
A. Traditional Rationales for Regulation
Under traditional theories of regulation-sometimes labeled the "Public In-
terest Theory" of regulation -two broad forms of "market failure" serve as
rationales for regulating the private sector.'05 The first is economic market fail-
ure, which exists when the market tends toward monopoly instead of competi-
tion."0 A natural monopoly is said to exist when a single firm can satisfy the
entire demand within a relevant market at the lowest cost possible due to econ-
103 Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 741, 765 (2010).
104 DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 444 (Dryden Press, 1995); see M.B. Adams & G.D.
Tower, Theories of Regulation: Some Reflections on the Statutory Supervision of Insurance
Companies in Anglo-American Countries, 19 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. (SPECIAL IS-
SUE) 156, 163-65 (1994); see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 335-37 (1974).
105 See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Over-
view, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 3 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981).
106 See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A
NUTSHELL 9 (4th ed. 1999).
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omies of scale. 7 In theory, this leaves the monopolist free to raise prices and
enjoy excessive profits. °8 Traditional remedies include antitrust laws, public
utility regulation, price controls, or even government ownership. 9 The goal of
these regulatory interventions is to create or preserve objectives that competi-
tive markets usually ensure, such as affordability, quality, and ongoing innova-
tion and investment."0 Of these goals, regulators typically emphasize price and
undertake special efforts to prevent price gouging. Since most social media
services are free of charge to consumers,"' accusations of market failure must
be premised on some other alleged harm to consumers.
A second broad category of regulation involves social goals and values.
Those goals and values can include the universal provision of a good or ser-
vice,"2 "fair" or "nondiscriminatory" industry practices," 3 cultural goals,"4 en-
vironmental values," 5 or privacy concerns.' 6 This category is an extremely
amorphous catchall," 7 but it is particularly relevant to discussions on social
media regulation because pricing is typically not a factor.
Calls for social media regulation can have both economic and social compo-
nents. However, proposals to classify social media operators as essential facili-
ties or public utilities-even if premised on social concerns-would involve
fairly comprehensive economic regulation. Thus, a closer examination of the
107 Posner, Natural Monopoly Regulation, supra note 8, at 548; see PIERCE & GELLHORN,
supra note 106, at 9.
108 See Posner, Natural Monopoly Regulation, supra note 8, at 550-53.
109 See id. at 548-550, 636.
"10 See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 106, at 9-11.
I I See, e.g., Daniel Lyons, It's Time to Pony Up: Why Good Web Sites Shouldn't Be
Free, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://commcns.org/l41rnJV.
112 See, e.g., In re Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future;
Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal
Service Support; Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime; Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up; Universal Service Reform - Mobil-
ity Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R.
17,663 l (Oct. 27, 2011) (reforming the FCC's universal service program).
113 See, e.g., Robinson-Patman Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 13-13h (2006) (stating that it is unlaw-
ful to, directly or indirectly, discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodi-
ties of like grade and quality).
114 See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f(2006) (requiring fed-
eral agencies to evaluate the effect of any federally funded undertaking or federally licensed
undertaking to evaluate the effect of the project on historical or culturally significant sites).
"5 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2006) (providing the Secretary of Transporta-
tion with authority to set average fuel economy standards for automobiles).
116 See, e.g., Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§
6501-6506 (2006) (prohibiting, without parental permission, the online collection of person-
ally identifiable information of any child under the age of 13).
"' PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 106, at 9-11 (discussing how social-goal regulations
do not "displace competition as a major method of control" and "is a supplement to the
market place ... designed to achieve specific purposes").
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definitions of "essential facilities" and "public utilities" and of the regulatory
policies associated with them is in order.
B. Definitional Confusion
While "natural monopoly" has a fairly standard meaning in the study of
economics, "' "public utilities" and "essential facilities" have been less rigor-
ously defined and, consequently, have been the subjects of continuing debate.
Alfred E. Kahn, author of the seminal Economics of Regulation, observed that
the line between public utilities and other industries "is a shadowy area...
[that] shifts over time."" 9 Professor Kevin Werbach aptly describes the prob-
lem at the outset: "'Utility' is a term, much like 'innovation,' that is widely
used but curiously immune to precise definition. Most descriptions of the con-
cept are circular: a utility is a company, such as a telephone network, water, or
electricity provider, which has special obligations because it functions as a
public utility."'28
As with "public utility" designations, the term "essential facility" is equally
mired in conceptual confusion.' In fact, the Supreme Court has avoided defin-
ing the term altogether in the handful of decisions that are considered "essen-
tial facility" cases.'22 Despite the ambiguity and potential circularity in these
118 See Posner, Natural Monopoly Regulation, supra note 8, at 550 (arising when one
single firm can satisfy the entire demand of a relevant market at a lower cost than any col-
lection of two or more firms, such that competition is not viable); see also PIERCE &
GELLHORN, supra note 106, at 8.
119 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS,
VOL. 1: ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 10 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970).
120 Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1788 (2011) (footnote
omitted).
121 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1989) (noting that most Supreme Court cases applying the essen-
tial facilities doctrine "do not speak of it and can be explained without reference to it").
122 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (affirm-
ing a jury verdict that the defendants attempted to monopolize or monopolized downhill
skiing facilities in Aspen, Colorado, but declining to rule on the lower court's holding that a
multi-day, multi-area ski ticket could be characterized as an "essential facility"); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (finding that denial of access to electricity
transmission lines constituted a Sherman Act violation); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the Associated Press had been violating the Sherman Anti-
trust Act by barring member newspapers from selling news to nonmember organizations);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (holding that it was
illegal to restrain trade by controlling all railway bridges and switching yards and thus re-
stricting competing railroads from servicing St. Louis); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d
982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the lower court erred in not instructing the jury on the
essential facility doctrine with regards to whether RFK stadium was essential to the opera-
tion of a professional football team in Washington); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit &
Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (lst Cir. 1952) (holding that there had been a violation of
[Vol. 21
Perils of Social Media as Public Utilities
definitional debates, it is the supposedly "essential" nature of the good or ser-
vice in question that leads to calls for public-utility classification and regula-
tion.'23 Thus, in antitrust parlance, an "essential facility" is a service or network
that is entirely unique and possesses few (or no) good alternatives.' Local
sewage and water systems are classic examples. A single bridge over a river in
a local community might be another. Professor Geoff Manne writes that, to
prevail in a monopolization case rooted in the essential facilities doctrine, a
plaintiff would need to prove: 1) control of the essential facility by a monopo-
list; 2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essen-
tial facility; 3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 4) the
feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.
25
The physical nature of these facilities often matters greatly in two senses.
First, the exclusive possession of an important physical network is thought to
create a "bottleneck" through which all other traffic must pass or all service
must flow. 26 Again, the only bridge in town is the paradigmatic example. Reg-
ulators typically require "non-discriminatory access" to such facilities for that
reason.'27 Alternatively, the government takes control of the asset or network in
question. 2
8
Second, the physical nature of the network or facility is important because it
the Sherman Antitrust Act when the named defendant excluded the plaintiff, a competitor,
from accessing the market).
123 Adam Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,
22-23 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-11, 2012); see WEST'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 2004).
124 See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv.
1187, 1211 (1999); cf Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992 ("To be "essential" a facility need not be
indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible
and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants.").
125 Geoffrey A. Manne, The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities: An Eco-
nomic & Legal Assessment, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE, supra note 58, at 419, 421 (cit-
ing MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)).
This test has been adopted by virtually every court to consider an essential facilities claim.
Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443,448-49 (2002).
126 See MCI Commc'n Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[A] refusal [to deal] may be unlawful because a monopolist's control of an essential
facility (sometimes called a "bottleneck") can extend monopoly power from one stage of
production to another, and from one market into another. Thus, the antitrust laws have im-
posed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility available
on non-discriminatory terms."); see also Pitofsky, Patterson & Hooks, supra note 125, at
447.
127 MCI Commc'n Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132 ("Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on
firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on non-
discriminatory terms."); see Pitofsky, Patterson & Hooks, supra note 125, at 447.
128 Public ownership has been used widely in the distribution of electricity at the munici-
pal level as well as for water utilities. See W. KIP VIsCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 413 (2d ed. 1998).
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entails significant fixed costs that are considered non-duplicable.' 2' These char-
acteristics often lead to the service being labeled a "natural monopoly," alt-
hough that term has also been hotly debated among economists.
Once the label "natural monopoly," "essential facility," or "public utility" is
assigned to a given network, facility, or service, governments typically impose
four types of regulation:w3
1) Control of firms' entry into and exit from the industry;...
2) price regulation (out of fear of "gouging" by the supposed monopolist);'3 2
3) conditions of service/quality controls;'33 and
4) universal service obligations (a general duty to serve all customers, typi-
cally in a well-defined geographic area). 34
Such regulations and obligations can be imposed by officials and agencies at
the federal, state, or local level, but typically such rules have been administered
by state public utility commissions ("PUCs"), as authorized by state-based en-
abling statutes.'35 Importantly, such state-based regulation raises special practi-
cal and legal problems for industries and forms of commerce that are more
interstate in character, thus necessitating some degree of federal oversight.'36
129 Rick Geddes, Public Utilities, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE HIs-
TORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1162, 1162-63 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest, eds., 2000), available at http://commcns.org/I7f6lf0.
3D0 See KAHN, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 119, at 3.
131 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (governing Bell
operating company entry into long-distance telephone service markets).
132 See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§751-760h
(1976) (repealed 1981) (authorizing price and allocation controls on crude oil and petroleum
products).
133 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(b) (2013) (requiring all commercial mobile radio service
providers to provide basic emergency 911 service).
'34 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254 (regarding basic telephone services being available to rural
consumers at reasonably comparable rates comparable to urban areas).
135 See, e.g., TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 1 1.002(a) (1997) ("This title is enacted to protect
the public interest inherent in the rates and services of public utilities. The purpose of this
title is to establish a comprehensive and adequate regulatory system for public utilities to
assure rates, operations, and services that are just and reasonable to the consumers and to the
utilities.").
136 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152 ("The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio .... "). Conflict over regulatory authority is
still unclear, providing businesses with uncertainty and competing regulators. See, e.g., In re
AT&T Petition to Launch a Proceeding Concerning the TDM-to-IP Transition; Petition of
the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association for a Rulemaking to Promote
and Sustain the Ongoing TDM-to-IP Evolution, Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless,
GN Docket No. 12-353, at 22-23 (Jan. 28, 2013) ("Nevertheless, even in the face of the
[FCC's] clear intent to create regulatory certainty with the Vonage Order, some state com-
missions have continued to assert authority to regulate VoIP services. The Commission
should once and for all make clear that VoIP and other IP-enabled services are interstate for
jurisdictional purposes and therefore not subject to a patchwork of 50 different state regula-
tory regimes that would slow the transition to IP networks .... ").
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C. Doubts Surrounding the Legitimacy or Application of Theories
Some scholars have challenged the notion that monopolies are in any sense
"natural" and have questioned exactly how "essential" some supposedly essen-
tial facilities are in reality. Others worry about the implications for innovation
and investment when the labels are too casually affixed.
"A key problem with many essential facilities cases is the non-essentiality of
the relevant facilities," notes Manne.'3' Too often, regulatory proponents or
plaintiffs in antitrust cases casually affix the label to an asset or system that
they are simply unwilling to attempt to duplicate themselves.'38 Law professors
Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp have argued that essential facilities
doctrine is harmful because
[Florcing a firm to share its monopoly is inconsistent with antitrust basic goals for two
reasons. First, consumers are no better off when a monopoly is shared; ordinarily,
price and output are the same as they were when one monopolist used the input alone.
Second, the right to share a monopoly discourages firms from developing their own
alternative inputs.
139
Areeda and Hovenkamp believe that the essential facilities doctrine "is both
harmful and unnecessary and should be abandoned." 4
Antitrust attorney and former Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate
similarly argued that the essential facilities doctrine threatens innovation:
At bottom, a plaintiff making an essential facilities argument is saying that the de-
fendant has a valuable facility that it would be difficult to reproduce, and suggesting
that is a reason for a court to intervene and impose a sharing duty. But at least in the
vast majority of the cases, the fact that the defendant has a highly valued facility is a
reason to reject sharing, not to require it, since forced sharing "may lessen the incen-




Most antitrust experts today tend to agree with Boston University law pro-
fessor Keith Hylton's conclusion that "there should be a presumption against
claims that consumer welfare will be enhanced by applying the essential facili-
ty doctrine to force owners to share access with competitors.' 42
Some economists have challenged the logic supporting natural monopoly
assertions, or argued that the source of monopoly often springs from other
137 Manne, supra note 125, at 421.
138 See id. at 420-21.
139 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 195 (3d ed. 2008).
140 Id. at 196.
41 R. Hewitt Pate, Hunton & Williams LLP, Refusals to Deal and Essential Facilities,
Testimony Submitted to U.S. Dep't of Justice/Fed. Trade Comm'n: Hearings on Single Firm
Conduct 18 (July 18, 2006) (quoting Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,408 (2004)), available at http://commcns.org/l2EINyn.




sources-namely, government.'43 Other economists and political scientists have
suggested that the notion sprang from a desire for a more activist government
in general.'"
Finally, others suggest that natural monopoly is unlikely to be a lasting
problem because technological change and new entry and innovation will help
markets innovate around existing bottlenecks or entrenched incumbents. "'
Even consumer advocates Mark Green and Ralph Nader have argued that,
"some care must be taken in defining natural monopoly, for what may appear
to be an inevitable state of non-competition may be nothing more than a lack
of imagination or an insensitivity to new technology.""'
Regardless of these definitional disputes, social networking services and so-
cial media sites do not qualify as either natural monopolies or essential facili-
ties. Part IV elaborates on this argument.
D. The Success of Liberalization Efforts Calls the Wisdom of Regulation into
Question
The success of market liberalization in many utility sectors has also called
into question the wisdom of regulating sectors thought to be "natural monopo-
lies" or considered to need regulatory oversight for other reasons.
Economists Robert Crandall and Jerry Ellig reviewed five major industries
that were once heavily regulated (airlines, natural gas, railroads, telecommuni-
cations, and trucking) and found that deregulation lowered prices, increased
competitive entry, broadened consumer choices, and improved overall service
quality."' Clifford Winston also studied the deregulation of these sectors and
reached similar conclusions. 4 Congressional Democrats, the Carter admin-
istration, and liberal consumer advocates, such as Alfred Kahn, the late Senator
143 See, e.g., James R. Nelson, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 1 1
ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 3 (1966).
144 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNAT-
URAL MONOPOLIES: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 21 (Robert W. Poole,
ed., 1985).
145 Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Natural Monopoly, 9 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 43,
44 (1996) ("If competition is viewed as a dynamic, rivalrous process of entrepreneurship,
then the fact that a single producer happens to have the lowest costs at any one point in time
is of little or no consequence. The enduring forces of competition-including potential
competition-will render free-market monopoly an impossibility.").
146 Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the
Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 872 (1973).
147 Robert Crandall & Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Les-
sons for the Electric Industry 3 (Ctr. for Market Processes, Inc., unnumbered working paper,
1997), available at http://commcns.org/l5doPYI.
148 Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists,
31 J. ECON. LIT. 1263, 1284-85 (1993).
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Edward Kennedy, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, and Ralph Nader,
led deregulation efforts because they became convinced that regulation was
harming consumer welfare by limiting competition and driving up prices.'49
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush formed a Council on Competitive-
ness to study the impact of economic regulatory reform on consumers and the
economy. 5' The council's final report found that "[w]hile the intentions of
many regulations are laudable, they can have unintended adverse impacts on
the general public."' 5 The report gathered all relevant economic evidence of
the impact of deregulation up to that point, and concluded that "deregulation is
saving the American economy at least tens of billions of dollars annually" and
that consumers in each of the six deregulated sectors were enjoying greater
choices from increased competition.'52
In light of this evidence, many economists and regulatory analysts today ex-
press more skepticism about "natural monopoly" claims. Rick Geddes, an as-
sociate professor in the Department of Policy Analysis and Management at
Comell University, concludes, "Where once regulated or government-owned
monopolies dominated because of the belief that most utilities were 'natural
monopolies,' there is now a growing consensus that competition can perform a
broader and more effective role."'53
E. The Problem of Regulatory Capture
Public utility regulation has also been widely criticized by economists and
political scientists who have documented how affected parties often "capture"
the rulemaking process and use it for their own ends.'54 The capture theory is
closely related to the "rent-seeking" and "political failure" theories developed
149 VIETOR, supra note 77, at 14, 50-52; Green & Nader, supra note 146, at 883-84; see
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Louis D.
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 266-68, 293-96 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984).
150 Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform: From Ford To Clinton, REGULA-
TION, Winter 1997, at 20, 23.
151 THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, THE LEGACY OF REGULATORY RE-
FORM: RESTORING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS, at v (1992).
152 See id. at v-vii (summarizing the success of economic deregulation in transporta-
tion-airlines, railroads, trucking-energy, telecommunications, and financial services).
153 Geddes, supra note 129, at 1163.
154 Another term for regulatory capture is "client politics," which, according to James Q.
Wilson, "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably
small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne
by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)." JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRA-
CY 76 (New York: Basic Books, 1989); see JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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by the public choice school of economics."' While the capture theory does not
explain all regulatory decisions or developments, it does explain with dismay-
ing consistency how self-interested motives explain political actions.'56 The
traditional normative theory of regulation failed to address this problematic,
recurring reality, as well as other deficiencies in the political decision-making
process.'57 Scholars developed a new, more robust economic theory of regula-
tion to help explain why the traditional paradigm was incomplete in this and
other ways.'58 These scholars argued that it was inappropriate to assume that
regulatory intervention was always "in the public interest" or would always
improve consumer welfare.'59
In particular, University of Chicago economist George Stigler's pioneering
work in developing this more robust economic theory of regulation revealed
how "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and oper-
ated primarily for its benefits."'" Kahn's meticulous study of the regulatory
process also identified how capture was a particular problem for utility sectors:
When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under nev-
er completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to
assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments
and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competi-
tion. .. . Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the
regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest
of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver these
goods.161
Many other scholars have identified capture as a recurring problem in regu-
lated industries. 6 They concur with UCLA Emeritus Professor of Business
'M GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, CATO INSTITUTE, Gov-
ERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 43-47 (2002); Adam Thierer, Regulatory
Capture: What the Experts Have Found, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://commcns.org/ldi3 Inn.
156 Thierer, Regulatory Capture, supra note 155.
157 Id.
158 VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 128, at 328-46.
1S9 See SAM PELTZMAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION
AFTER A DECADE OF DEREGULATION 43, 59 (1989), available at
http://commcns.org/l 8WjkRX.
160 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971). For a broader discussion of capture theory, see VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON,
supra note 128, at 327-46.
161 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS,
VOL. 2: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 12, 46 (2d ed. MIT Press 1988) (1971).
162 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995); Anthony Downs, An
Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135 (1957); Green
& Nader, supra note 146, at 871; William A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. L. & ECONS. 151 (1972); Jean-
Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1,089 (1991); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction
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Economics Harold Demsetz's conclusion that, "in utility industries, regulation
has often been sought because of the inconvenience of competition."'63 Both
the railroad" 4 and airline'65 industries provide particularly egregious examples
of such capture. Both industries used their respective regulators-the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board-to promote carteli-
zation and market protectionism."' When capture occurs, it lessens not only the
innovation that would flow from other market entrants and entrepreneurs, but
also the innovation of the regulated entity itself, which shifts its focus to con-
trolling the regulatory process and sheltering itself from disruptive change.'67
One can debate the chicken-and-egg question of which came first-the as-
signment of utility status or the capture of regulators by special interests-but
the inquiry is largely irrelevant. Capture is a recurring problem within such
sectors and undercuts traditional "public interest" rationales for intervention.
and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987);
Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation: The Foundation ofAgency-
Clientele Relationships, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers
and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 3 AEI J. GOV'T & Soc'Y 12-6
(1983).
163 Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, II J.L. & EcON. 55, 61 (1968).
164 Thomas Frank, Obama and 'Regulatory Capture', WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2009),
http://commcns.org/lfeNwJD ("The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, was set up to regulate railroad freight rates in the 1880s. Soon thereaf-
ter, Richard Olney, a prominent railroad lawyer, came to Washington to serve as Grover
Cleveland's attorney general. Olney's former boss asked him if he would help kill off the
hated ICC. Olney's reply, handed down at the very dawn of Big Government, should be
regarded as an urtext of the regulatory state: 'The Commission ... is, or can be made, of
great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the
railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older
such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and
railroad view of things ... The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to
utilize it."').
165 MCCRAW, supra note 149, at 263 ("Clearly, in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act [of
1938], Congress intended to bring stability to airlines. What is not clear is whether the legis-
lature intended to cartelize the industry. Yet this did happen. During the forty years between
passage of the act of 1938 and the appointment of [Alfred] Kahn to the CAB chairmanship,
the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry more or less in its configu-
ration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade price competition. Instead the CAB ordi-
narily required that all carriers flying a certain route charge the same rates for the same class
of customer ... A second policy had to do with the CAB's stance toward the entry of new
companies into the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or
not 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity' mandated that new carriers should re-
ceive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no applicant met these tests.
In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new trunkline carrier had been permitted to
join the sixteen that existed in 1938. And those sixteen, later reduced to ten by a series of
mergers, still dominated the industry in the 1970s. All these companies ... developed into





Capture also explains why many natural monopoly assertions are simply false,
because, as noted in the previous section, there is nothing natural about a mo-
nopoly or a public utility using regulation as a shield from competition or in-
novation. 68 Writing in 1940, economist Horace M. Gray noted that:
[B]etween 1907 and 1938, the policy of state-created, state-protected monopoly be-
came firmly established over a significant portion of the economy and became the
keystone of modem public utility regulation. Henceforth, the public utility status was
to be the haven of refuge for all aspiring monopolists who found it too difficult, too
costly, or too precarious to secure and maintain monopoly by private action alone. 69
IV. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH SOCIAL NETWORKS AS PUBLIC
UTILITIES
Building on the discussion in Part III, this section outlines the downsides of
assigning "public utility" or "essential facility" classifications to social media
platforms.
A. Social Media Are Not Natural Monopolies or Essential Facilities
Regardless of the definitional deficiencies associated with public utility des-
ignations and the essential facilities doctrine, social media platforms possess
none of their supposed qualities.
Social media services are not physical resources with high fixed costs, and
they do not possess "bottlenecks" in any conventional sense of the term. Even
if network externalities exist that reward larger social media platforms, 7 ' and
even if an existing social media platform denies a competitor use of its "facili-
ty," competitors can duplicate such platforms and, as documented below, have
continued to do so. If the tumultuous first decade of web 2.0 social media ser-
vices has taught us anything, it is that competitors' ability to duplicate these
services comes down to the challenge of building a user base, not building a
physical infrastructure. 7' The infrastructure that is needed to compete is essen-
168 Even regulatory proponents like Tim Wu seem to understand this. He writes, "Mo-
nopolies may be a natural development, but the most enduring ones are usually state-
sponsored. All the more so since no one has ever conceived a better way of scotching com-
petitors than to make them comply with complex federal regulation." Wu, New Monopolists,
supra note 62.
169 Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL.
ECON. 481, 486 (1940).
170 Keith Hampton, It's a Matter of Network Externalities, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2012,
9:54 AM), http://commcns.org/laJlFUj (describing the theory that more people are likely to
use social media when others within their circle are using social media).
171 For example, Facebook overtook MySpace as the most successful social networking
site by creating a larger user base. Adam Hartung, How Facebook Beat MySpace, FORBES
(Jan. 14, 2011, 12:36 AM), http://commcns.org/178yar6.
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tially code, computers, and servers. This digital infrastructure represents a huge
distinction from the physical infrastructure required in other industries, where
creating competing facilities requires a massive capital investment. Rolling out
a new version of code simply does not entail anywhere near the same fixed
costs as rolling out new physical towers, wires, and distribution hardware that
are used in traditional communications networks.
The breakneck pace of change in social media also makes these sites and
services distinct from utilities. Not only are most cyberservices relatively new,
they are also rapidly displacing each other.' Today's social networking plat-
forms evolved from markets that were once referred to as "web portals."'73 So-
cial networks and algorithmic search engines quickly overtook the giants of the
web portal era-AOL, AltaVista, CompuServe, and Prodigy.74
Moreover, the first generation of social networks has largely come and gone.
Facebook, Six Degrees, Friendster, Live Journal, and MySpace, which used to
be the leading social networking sites, have faded quickly from the spotlight.'75
In February 2007, a columnist for the UK newspaper The Guardian asked,
"Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?"' 76 A short time later, MySpace lost
its early lead and became a major liability for owner Rupert Murdoch. Mur-
doch paid $580 million for MySpace in 2005, only to sell it for $35 million in
June 201 1.177
It would not be surprising if the first generation of social networking mar-
kets morphed and divided again in the near future. Indeed, new alternatives
continue to emerge from unexpected quarters. In July 2011, myYearbook, a
social networking site started five years earlier by two high school-aged sib-
lings, sold for $100 million.' It already had 20 million members when it
172 Adam Thierer, Of 'Tech Titans' and Schumpeter's Vision, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011,
12:31 PM), http://commcns.org/ldJCSwF.
173 Jeffrey F. Rayport, Social Networks Are the New Web Portals, BLOOMBERG Busi-
NESSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/143VOiD (describing how social networks
incorporate web portals, which serve as gateways to other websites, into their designs).
174 Michele Masterson, Memories of CompuServe, Prodigy and Other Dinosaurs, CRN
BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://commcns.org/l14WCh3K.
175 danah boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N 1, 1 (2007), available at
http://commcns.org/16G2eUR.
176 Victor Keegan, Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7,
2007), http://commcns.org/17fAOV8 ("John Barrett of TechNewsWorld claims that
MySpace is well on the way to becoming what economists call a 'natural monopoly.' Users
have invested so much social capital in putting up data about themselves it is not worth their
changing sites, especially since every new user that MySpace attracts adds to its value as a
network of interacting people.").
177 Brian Stelter, News Corporation Sells MySpacefor $35 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2011, 2:31 PM), http://commcns.org/l6G3Ny.
178 Deborah Sweeney, my Yearbook: The $100 Million Startup Name You Need To Know,
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The rapid metamorphosis of this market, the constant entry of new players
and platforms, and the unrelenting reality of disruptive change should call into
question pessimistic fears about "first-mover advantage," "technological lock-
in," and "winner-take-all" economics.' These dangers have not manifested
179 Id.
180 Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 915, 915-16, 933, 965-66 (2008). Also, as will be noted in the next section,
government attempts to supposedly "solve" the lock-in problem run the risk of creating a
self-fulfilling prophecy by facilitating the very essential facilities or natural monopoly regu-
lators fear. Id. at 966 ("Antitrust policy towards lock-in risks causing the very problem that
it tries to solve. Private sector experimentation is particularly valuable in resolving uncer-
tainties in discovering and developing new technologies. Antitrust policy that targets suc-
cessful innovators threatens to reduce such experimentation. By enforcing standardization,
antitrust discourages the type of innovation that generates product variety. By requiring
successful firms to disclose IP, antitrust damages incentives to innovate both for leading
firms and for their competitors. By requiring compatibility, antitrust raises prices and costs,
while discouraging the development of unique proprietary systems. By limiting the ability
of successful firms to add product features and to bundle products, antitrust reduces incen-
tives to improve technologies. Avoiding such misguided antitrust policies allows competi-
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themselves in the real world, as many pessimistic analysts and policymakers
predicted they would. 8' Chum and change have been constant in information
technology markets. Market entry is not as cost prohibitive, as is typically the
case in natural monopolies.
Finally, although some regulatory proponents increasingly speak of larger
social media platforms like Facebook as a sort of "social utility" or a "social
commons" and claim that they are essential to one's social existence," 2 the
reality is that such sites are not essential to survival, economic success, or
online life. There are many different speech platforms from which to choose
from. While Facebook is the most popular social networking service today, 3
the company could lose its competitive edge tomorrow. Users can take ad-
vantage of Linkedln, Google+, MySpace, Twitter, or a number of other, small-
er social media services.
Moreover, unlike water and electricity, life can go on without Facebook or
other social networking services. In fact, many people never use Facebook and
still have plenty of ways to find and interact with friends, family, coworkers,
and acquaintances. These methods include phone calls and voice messages,
instant messaging, email and physical mail, and face-to-face contact. Many
businesses and individuals with accounts on popular sites, like Facebook, can
utilize it to simply redirect visitors to other social media sites.'84 Furthermore,
users can transport their digital profiles over to alternative platforms fairly
easily. 5 From an antitrust perspective, this ability is important because it less-
ens the concern that consumers could somehow be denied access to an essen-
tive markets to continue unlocking technology.").
181 Economist Stan Liebowitz, author of Re-Thinking the Network Economy, has shown
how these much-ballyhooed concepts have been greatly overplayed. He writes, "This idea
that being first is essential was a truly pernicious bit of faux wisdom. This idea has helped
firms madly throw themselves off a cliff like lemmings, and to do so thinking they were
bound for glory." In terms of lock-in and winner-takes-all, he has argued, "The type of lock-
in that most strongly supports claims of first mover advantages [has] no empirical support
whatsoever. It appears to be a theory with little or no application to the world. ... Internet
markets are no more likely to be winner-takes-all than the brick-and-mortar counterparts of
these firms." STAN LIEBOWITZ, RETHINKING THE NETWORKED ECONOMY: THE TRUE FORCES
DRIVING THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 27, 55 (2002).
182 boyd, supra note 7.
183 Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1773-
74, 1781 (2012).
184 For example, businesses and individuals can add their Twitter handles to their Face-
book pages to redirect Facebook visitors to their Twitter pages; see Lauren Dugan, No
One's Listening to Your Tweets? Start Putting Your Twitter Handle Everywhere, ALL TWIT-
TER (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://commcns.org/l2Fp4i7.
185 Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More Than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recog-
nition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 218-219 (2012) (noting how
data portability allows users to export their data in a format that they could use in another
network or in distributed social networks).
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tial service.'86 Again, in the case of social media, consumers have many options
to connect and communicate.
B. The Danger of Creating An Actual Social Media Monopoly
A second danger in classifying social media as essential facilities or public
utilities, is that, similar to applying utility status to telecommunications com-
panies generations ago,'87 such a classification could become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The very act of imposing "utility" obligations on a particular plat-
form or company tends to lock it in as the preferred or only choice in its sector.
Public utility regulation shelters a utility from competition once it is enshrined
as such.'88 Also, by forcing standardization or a common platform, regulation
can erect de jure or de facto barriers to entry that restrict beneficial innovation
and disrupt market leaders.'89
Regulatory proponents like Wu apparently do not see the irony of classify-
ing all social media services as "monopolies" when so many of them compete
vigorously against each other and market leaders are constantly being dis-
placed. For example, when Wu released his book in 2010, he could not have
foreseen that Google's new Google+ social network would launch and grow
faster than any prior entrant, providing a very formidable threat to Facebook. 9
While such a market response or competitive landscape is atypical in utility
sectors, regulation could foreclose such dynamic entry and competition in so-
cial media.
C. Public Utility Regulation Would Stifle Dynamic Digital Innovation and
Raise Prices
Regulated utilities typically are not as innovative as other industries. The
mechanisms used to control utilities (e.g., price controls, rate of return regula-
tion, entry and exit barriers) guarantee consumers access to a plain vanilla ser-
vice at a "fair" price-but, without any incentive for utility providers to earn a
greater return, innovation typically suffers. ' 9 Thus, treating today's leading
186 Waller, supra note 183, at 1771 (providing that the goal of antitrust law is to create
options and limit "the abuse of market power" in essential services).
187 Werbach, Network Utility, supra note 120 at 1788-89, 1791.
188 KAHN, INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 161, at 116 ("No barrier to entry is more
absolute than one imposed or enforced by the sovereign power of the state. All others are
potentially subject to hurdling, erosion, or circumvention.").
189 VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 128, at 568-70.
190 Alex Masters, Watch out Facebook, Google+ is Now the World's Second Largest
Social Network and It's Growing Fast!, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:00 PM),
http://commcns.org/1dLMXZL.
191 VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 128, at 570 ("If a regulatory agency
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social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to freeze market-
place innovation and encourage users to settle for a regulated platform.
Of course, social networking sites are already readily available to everyone
and are almost universally free of charge. 9 Thus, the "universal service" ob-
jective that motivates many calls for public utility regulation is already satis-
fied in this case. Regulators have often created complex cross-subsidization
schemes within public utility sectors to ensure that some basic level of service
was available to all consumers at a "just, reasonable, and affordable" rate.'93
For social media sites and services, a combination of online advertising and
"freemium" business models utilize price discrimination techniques to charge
premium users while keeping basic service cheap or free for all other users.'94
Not only are social media sites largely free and universally available, they
are also constantly innovating.'95 Thus, both the problem and the regulatory
solution are unclear. It is clear, however, that the problem long associated with
regulated public utilities, so-called "monopoly sloth" (a general lack of incen-
tives to innovate),' 96 could easily occur in social media "utilities" as the ab-
sence of competitive pressures, coupled with regulator preference for and pro-
tection of utility "monopolists," would plainly reduce the business incentive
for dominant social media platforms to innovate.'97 Just as Foursquare pres-
sured Facebook to respond by introducing locational check-ins in today's un-
regulated marketplace,'98 as a utility in the ecosystem advocated by regulatory
proponents, Facebook would likely never have had a competitor like Four-
square against which to respond.
Moreover, it is unclear how policymakers would define markets in the social
media context. For example, Twitter's particular market remains unclear, and it
will be interesting to see how narrowly or broadly FTC officials define that
prevents a regulated firm from reaping the return from innovating by always making it price
at average cost, then the regulated firm will have little or no incentive to innovate.").
192 Tom Johansmeyer, Social Media is Free: Social Media Marketing is Not, SOCIAL-
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://commcns.org/181vHLr.
193 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1) (2006); see, e.g., Universal
Service, FCC, http://commcns.org/1 cdcERo (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
194 Diane Ebersole, Software as a Service for the Legal Community, 88 MICH B.J. 50, 50
(2009); CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 26-27 (2008).
195 For example, Facebook introduced an application called Poke to compete with Snap-
chat, a free messaging application that protects users' privacy by automatically deleting
messages after a timed period. Felix Gillette, Snapchat and the Erasable Future of Social
Media, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2013), http://commcns.org/i 5tpUj 1.
196 Glenn Manishin, Off With Their Heads! The Fantasy Google Monopoly, FORBES
(Feb. 3, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://commcns.org/ Idk3MMT.
197 Werbach, Network Utility, supra note 120, at 1787 (noting that less regulation can
encourage innovation).
198 Jenna Wortham, Rather than Share Your Location, Foursquare Wants to Suggest
One, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://commcns.org/l 7bVdRN.
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market if they continue to investigate Twitter's business practices. It is im-
portant to recall that Twitter has only existed since 2006, '9 and it continues to
rapidly evolve alongside many other digital innovations. Similarly, Facebook
is only nine years old and continues to rapidly evolve. 0 Of course, companies
are not precluded from offering services similar to Twitter and Facebook.
Many competitors already do.2°1 It is vital, therefore, that policymakers do not
box in emerging, quickly evolving digital sectors by artificially constraining or
narrowly defining their contours.
These market-definition concerns are especially important because of how
long it takes to formulate regulations using rulemaking. °2 In a market that
changes rapidly, taking several months or even years to complete rulemakings
will almost certainly mean that most rules will be outdated by the time that
they are implemented. Once implemented, there will be very little incentive to
rework to conform to drastically altering market contours. Regulation could
retard innovation in social media markets by denying firms the ability to
evolve or innovate across pre-established, artificial market boundaries."3
D. Regulation Could Impose Direct Costs On Consumers
While price has been the crucial variable in most regulatory deliberations
over utilities in the past,24 it has been largely irrelevant in the context of mod-
em social media platforms because they are generally free of charge.215 It is far
more difficult to identify market power or consumer harm in the case of social
media because regulators typically look first to the price variable as a measure
of abusive behavior by a supposed monopolist."
199 Melodie M. Dan, Social Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated Method to Effect
Service of Process, I CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 183, 202 (2010).
200 boyd & Ellison, supra note 175, at 1; for example, Facebook began as an online so-
cial network for Harvard students and since 2004 has grown into "the social media jugger-
naut" and "exploded to 600 million active users." Hartung, supra note 171.
201 For example, Google's social networking website Orkut, which was created in 2004,
allows users to create online communities by posting extensive profiles and discussion top-
ics. Sajai Singh, Anti-Social Networking: Learning the Art of Making Enemies in Web 2.0,
12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2008).
202 Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-88 (1992).
203 Derrick Harris, Will a Crackdown on Privacy Kill Big Data Innovation, GIGAOM
(May 16, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://commcns.org/I9WGMTO.
204 PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 106, at 9; Posner, Natural Monopoly Regulation,
supra note 8, at 550, 577-78.
205 Johansmeyer, supra note 192; Chris Anderson, The Economics of Giving It Away,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2009) http://commcns.org/l dn4vOo ("The standard business model for
Web companies that don't actually have a business model is advertising. A popular service
will have lots of users, and a few ads on the side will pay the bills.").
206 See Posner, Natural Monopoly Regulation, supra note 8, at 550; see also Brent
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Another danger of government intervention in this context is that regulation
has the potential to generate a direct cost for consumers in the form of higher
prices. If social media operators are classified as utilities and the government
regulates their data-collection practices or advertising-based business models,
sites may impose fees for the first time as they struggle to adjust to the new
rules.2"' Because regulation may make it more expensive for the firms to oper-
ate, social media providers may need to reallocate those costs to consumers in
order to remain profitable.
Today, online advertising allows consumers to enjoy a cornucopia of inno-
vative, and mostly free, sites and services. ' 8 Government regulation has the
potential to destroy the implicit quid pro quo currently governing online sites
and services-that consumers enjoy a bevy of free resources and services in
exchange for allowing ads and data collection'--by regulating data collection
or online advertising practices.2 '
Precisely because so few social media operators charge for their services, it
is impossible to know the elasticity of demand and the extent of consumers'
willingness to pay for any particular service. If regulation spawns charges for
social media services, consumers may revolt because they have grown accus-
tomed to an abundance of "free" online services."' It is impossible to deter-
mine what prices online providers might seek to charge for their services, but
anything more than the $0.00 they currently charge will likely shock consum-
ers. " ' For social media services that do not generate revenue, regulation could
potentially discourage further investment and innovation. Furthermore, if the
government imposes utility-like regulation on specific social media platforms,
and those interests eventually "capture" and control the regulatory process,
Skorup & Adam Thierer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integra-
tion in the Information Economy, 65 FED. COMM. L.J.. 157 (2013).
207 Adam Thierer, The Danger of Making Facebook, Linkedln, Google And Twitter Pub-
lic Utilities, FORBES (July 24, 2011, 3:31 PM), http://commcns.org/I 7bXFHZ; A Status Up-
date on the Development of Voluntary Do-Not-Track Standards: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., I I 3th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Adam Thierer,
Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason Univ.) (outlining the costs associ-
ated with regulatory restrictions on data collection).
208 Johansmeyer, supra note 192; Adam Thierer, Advertising, Commercial Speech, and
First Amendment Parity, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 503 (2011).
209 Thierer, Danger of Making Public Utilities, supra note 207; see Johansmeyer, supra
note 192; see also Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information
Control Is Failing, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 409 (2013).
210 Adam Thierer, Public Interest Comment on Federal Trade Commission Report, Pro-
tecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change 21-22 (George Mason Univ. ed.
2011), available at http://commcns.org/l 5gaKtn.
211 Adam Thierer, A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates,
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prices will likely rise once these companies are sheltered from competition.
E. Social Media Regulation Could Raise First Amendment Issues
The traditional linchpins of media regulation in the United States-
especially the regulation of broadcast radio and television-have been scarcity
and the supposed need for government allocation of the underlying resource
(the broadcast spectrum).' Employing these rationales, lawmakers, regulators,
and judges have all accorded broadcast platforms a lesser constitutional stand-
ard of review as it pertains to free speech regulation. These rationales for re-
duced speech protections have always been controversial, however." 4 As tradi-
tional media markets have evolved and grown more diverse and competitive,
these rationales have become even more dubious.25
Regardless, these regulatory rationales are completely inapplicable to mod-
em social media platforms, which are abundant, rapidly evolving, and entirely
privately-owned. Depending on what form social media regulation takes, there-
fore, profound First Amendment issues could be raised. Any regulation that
requires a social media operator to offer access to competitors or even users on
regulated terms could qualify as compelled speech. For example, an effort to
213 See Nat. Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (holding that the
FCC can issue regulations pertaining to associations between broadcast networks and affili-
ated stations); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding
that the First Amendment permits a federal agency to formulate rules to allow persons de-
famed or potentially defamed access to equal time to respond and a fairness standard for
editorial speech by broadcast radio stations).
214 Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, "The scheme of granting free licenses for use of a frequen-
cy band, though defended on the supposition that scarce channels had to be husbanded for
the best social use, was in fact what created a scarcity. Such licensing was the cause not the
consequence of scarcity." ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 141 (1983). As
spectrum engineer Charles L. Jackson noted during a 1982 Senate Commerce Committee
hearing, "If there ever was any scarcity of electronic communications outlets that scarcity
was artificial and legalistic. It grew out of policy constraints and not out of fundamental
technological limitations." Freedom of Expression: Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong. 50 (1982) (statement of Dr. Charles
L. Jackson, Shooshan and Jackson). Furthermore, in 1959, Nobel Prize-winning economist
Ronald Coase argued, "[lI]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in
the economic system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount
and scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists. Land, labor, and capital are all
scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation. It is true that some mech-
anism has to be employed to decide who, out of the many claimants, should be allowed to
use the scare resource. But the way this is usually done in the American economic system is
to employ the price mechanism, and this allocates resources to users without the need for
government regulation." Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. &ECON. 1, 14 (1959).
215 See Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First Amend-
ment Standard for the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 432-33 (2007).
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mandate API neutrality or any variant of algorithmic neutrality would com-
promise the editorial discretion and the First Amendment rights of platform
owners. The Supreme Court has rejected such mandates for newspapers, which
were far less dynamic or competitive than modem social media." 6 The Court
has also held that compelling a private corporation to include a newsletter with
content provided by third parties was a First Amendment violation." 7 Compel-
ling certain speech requires association with speech that may be disagreeable
to those who have to disseminate it, and violates the First Amendment." 8 Some
of the proposed social media regulations discussed in Part II, such as the eraser
button or the right to be forgotten concept, would also likely give rise to im-
mediate First Amendment challenges because of their direct impact on the free
flow of information online." 9
So far, courts have rejected most attempts to regulate online content and ex-
pression.22 ° In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court declared that a law that plac-
es a "burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving" the same goal, thus striking down
the Communications Decency Act's effort to regulate underage access to adult-
oriented websites."2 ' There are widely available methods of dealing with vari-
ous social media concerns that would be less restrictive than regulation. The
next section discusses these methods.
F. Less Restrictive Means Are Available to Address Concerns
While privacy concerns motivate some calls for utility-like regulation of so-
cial media platforms, less onerous remedies are available to address those is-
sues. 222 Disclosure and data-portability policies-either voluntary or perhaps
even mandatory-would address many of the problems that critics raise. Dis-
closure policies reveal to social media users exactly what data are collected
216 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("Itlhe choice of
material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time").
217 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (holding
that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting independent political
expenditures by corporations and unions).
218 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1986).
219 Thierer, Kids, Privacy, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 7.
220 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181,
184 (3d Cir. 2008).
221 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
222 Adam Thierer, Pursuit of Privacy, supra note 209, at 436-454.
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and retained on the sites they visit.223 Data portability allows consumers to use
their social media data-including messages, contacts, calendars, and pic-
tures-across many sites and services. 24
Whether the concerns relate to child safety, online privacy, or reputation
management, a diverse array of private empowerment tools is already available
to block or limit various types of data collection. 25 For instance, every major
web browser has cookie control tools to help users manage data collection.226
"Ad preference managers" have also caught on with major search companies.
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! all offer easy-to-use opt-out tools and educa-
tional webpages that clearly explain to consumers how digital advertising
works.227 Meanwhile, DuckDuckGo offers an alternative search experience that
blocks data collection altogether.228
Major browser providers also offer a "private browsing" mode that allows
users to avoid having their data collected or their online activity tracked.229 This
functionality is available as a menu option in Microsoft's Internet Explorer
("InPrivate Browsing"),23 Google's Chrome ("Incognito"),23"' and Mozilla's
Firefox ("Private Browsing").232 Firefox also has many add-on programs that
provide the functional equivalent to a private browsing mode. " Dennis
O'Reilly of CNetNews.com notes that, "[w]ith just a little effort you can set
Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Google Chrome to clear out
and block the cookies most online ad networks and other web trackers rely on
223 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Staying Private on the New Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2013), http://commcns.org/l 6KWlpr.
224 See Christopher Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147,
1154 (2012).
225 Thierer, Kids, Privacy, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 10-12.
226 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Internet Cookies: When is Permission Consent?, 85 NEB.
L. REV. 383, 388 (2006).
227 See, e.g., Ads Settings, GOOGLE, http://commcns.org/17cuDbn (last visited Apr. 13,
2013); Your Privacy and Microsoft Personalized Ads, MICROSOFT,
http://commcns.org/181V7bS (last visited Apr. 13, 2013); Ad Interest Manager, YAHOO!,
http://commcns.org/IcdElJU (last visited Apr. 13, 2013); Policies and Principles, GOOGLE,
http://commcns.org/19KEy6h (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
228 Privacy, DUCK DUCK Go, http://commcns.org/14ZU4al (last visited Apr. 13, 2013);
see Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Can Search Engines Compete on Privacy?, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 25, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://commcns.org/l2IaK8y.
229 Thierer, Kids, Privacy, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 10.
230 InPrivate Browsing, MICROSOFT WINDOws, http://commcns.org/14ZUrS3 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2013).
231 Incognito mode (browse in private), GOOGLE CHROME, http://commcns.org/l fgRVfa
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
232 Private Browsing - Browse the Web Without Saving Information About the Sites You
Visit, MOZILLA SUPPORT, http://commcns.org/lcdFwsE (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
233 Add-Ons: Search Results for tag 'incognito', MOZILLA, http://commcns.org/ 16Oj4ED
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
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to build their valuable user profiles. 234
There are also many supplemental tools and browser add-ons that users can
implement to better protect their online privacy by managing cookies, blocking
web scripts, and making the web-browsing experience more anonymous.3
Similar to the marketplace for parental control technologies, a remarkable
amount of innovation characterizes the market for privacy empowerment
tools. 236 These tools represent a less restrictive way of dealing with privacy
concerns than do proposals to regulate social media platforms as public utili-
ties.
The existence of less restrictive methods for protecting privacy and consum-
er choice in social media services is important for two reasons. First, from a
constitutional perspective, the First Amendment requires that proposed con-
tent-based regulations satisfy a least-restrictive means test. 7 Arguably, these
successful, free, and widely-available private sector solutions are much less
restrictive than government regulation of speech.238 Second, as University of
California Berkeley law professors Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K.
Mulligan note:
Since 1996 the [Federal Trade Commission] has actively used its broad authority un-
der Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits 'unfair or deceptive practices,' to take
an active role in the governance of privacy protection, ranging from issuing guidance
regarding appropriate practices for protecting personal consumer information, to
bringing enforcement actions challenging information practices alleged to cause con-
239sumer injury.
The Commission has documented these efforts in a recent white paper on
privacy policy.24 ° Such targeted enforcement actions also represent a superior
approach to dealing with problems that might arise on social media sites.
234 Dennis O'Reilly, Add 'Do Not Track' to Firefox, IE, Google Chrome, CNETNEWS
(Dec. 7, 2010,2:17 PM), http://commcns.org/ldknDLS.
235 Thierer, Kids, Privacy, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 11.
236 See id. at 10-12.
237 See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (overturning an ordinance
which prohibited the distribution of handbills, stating that the city's goal of controlling litter
should instead be pursued through anti-littering measures, because such measures would
intrude less on free speech rights); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989) (noting that time, place, or manner regulation of protected free speech must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interest. However, regu-
lation need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means in doing so).
238 Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Up-
grades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 743 (2003) ("The state ought
not help those who can better help themselves.").
239 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground and on the
Books, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273 (2011).
240 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID




To summarize, public utility-like regulation of social media is not neces-
sary because there are market solutions or more targeted and less restrictive
government remedies to privacy problems. The market solutions are extensive
and almost universally free of charge to users. Moreover, these solutions are
evolving to address emerging problems and are likely more timely than gov-
ernment solutions, which typically lag behind marketplace developments.
V. PROBLEMS WITH SPECIFIC REGULATORY PROPOSALS
Zittrain's and Wu's proposals deserve special attention. While they have not
suggested formally classifying social media as public utilities, they borrow
their regulatory proposals from the toolbox traditionally reserved for networks
or technologies that are considered to be natural monopolies or essential facili-
ties.
A. Zittrain's Adverse Possession and API Neutrality
There are many problems with the logic of Zittrain's API neutrality proposal
and with the application of adverse possession to social media platforms or
digital applications. Most developers who offer open APIs are unlikely to close
them later because they do not want to incur the wrath of "those who built on
top of their interfaces," to use Zittrain's parlance."' Social media services
make themselves more attractive to users and advertisers by providing plat-
forms with a vast array of opportunities for diverse interactions and innova-
tions.242
Thus, a powerful self-correcting mechanism is at work in this space. If so-
cial media operators were to lock down their platforms or applications in a
highly restrictive fashion, both application developers and average users would
likely revolt. Moreover, a move to foreclose or limit generative opportunities
could spur more entry and innovation as other application developers ("app
developers") and users seek out more open, pro-generative alternatives.
Consider an example involving Apple and the iPhone. Shortly after the iPh-
one's release, Apple reversed itself and opened its iPhone platform to third-
party app developers." 3 The result was an outpouring of innovation. Customers
in more than 123 countries had downloaded more than twenty-five billion apps
from Apple's App Store as of March 2012.' 44
241 ZirrRAIN, supra note 9, at 184.
242 Adam Thierer, The Problem with API Neutrality, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Sept. 21,
2012), http://commcns.org/18iIecd.
243 Id.
244 Press Release, Apple Press Info, Apple's App Store Downloads Top 25 Billion (Mar.
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What if Apple decides to shut its App Store and prohibit all third-party con-
tributions, after initially allowing them? No obvious incentive exists for Apple
to do so, and numerous competitive reasons exist for Apple not to close off
third-party development," 5 especially because its application dominance is a
key element of its success in the smartphone and tablet sectors.246 Under
Zittrain's proposed paradigm, regulators would treat the iPhone as the equiva-
lent of a commoditized common carriage device and compel the App Store to
operate on regulated, public utility-like terms without editorial or technologi-
cal (and perhaps interoperability) control by Apple itself. However, if Apple
were to open the door to developers only to slam it shut a short time later, the
company would likely lose those developers and customers to alternative plat-
forms. Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and others would likely seize the oppor-
tunity to capitalize on Apple's business by offering a wealth of stores and de-
vices that allow users greater freedom.247 Market choices, not regulatory edicts,
such as mandatory API neutrality, should determine the future of the Internet.
The same logic indicates the likely counterproductive effects of efforts to
impose API neutrality on Twitter. Until recently, Twitter had a voluntary open
access policy, in that it allowed nearly unlimited third-party reuse and modifi-
cation of its API.248 It is now partially abandoning that policy by taking greater
control over the uses of its API. 49 This policy reversal will undoubtedly lead to
claims that the company is acting as one of Wu's proverbial "information em-
pires ' and that Zittrain's API neutrality regime should be put in place as a
remedy. Indeed, Zittrain has already referred to Twitter's move as a "bait-and-
switch" and recommended an API neutrality remedy.25' Zittrain's remarks may
foreshadow more pressure from academics and policymakers that will first
encourage Twitter to continue open access, but then potentially force the com-
pany to grant nondiscriminatory access to its platform on regulated terms.
Nondiscriminatory access would represent a step toward the forced commodi-
tization of the Twitter API and the involuntary surrender of the company's
property rights to some collective authority that will manage the platform as a
5, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/l aN3ihg.
245 Thierer, Problem with API Neutrality, supra note 242.
246 Id.
247 See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Can Apple's App Store Maintain Its Lead Over Google
Play?, CNET NEWS (Sept. 27, 2012, 6:52 AM), http://commcns.org/17cUFLs; see also
Claire Cain Miller, Apple's Feud with Google is Now Felt on iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2012), http://commcns.org/l7k4JyG.
248 Thierer, Problem with API Neutrality, supra note 242.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 TWITTER, http://commcns.org/ldMuA7e, Mar. 12, 2011, 8:01 PM (last visited Apr.
13, 2013) (citation omitted) ("The Twitter move looks like the kind of bait-and-switch that I
worry about at http://yupnet.org/zittrain/archives/l9#25.").
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common carrier or essential facility.
Yet again, innovation and competitive entry remain possible in this arena.
There is nothing stopping other microblogging or short-messaging services
from offering alternatives to Twitter. Some people would decry the potential
lack of interoperability among competing services at first, but innovators
would quickly find ways to circumvent this. A decade ago, similar angst sur-
rounded AOL's growing power in the instant-messaging ("IM") marketplace.252
Many feared that AOL would monopolize the market and exclude competitors
by denying interconnection.53 Nonetheless, markets evolved quickly. Today,
anyone can download a free chat client like Digsby or Adium to manage IM
services from AOL, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, and just about any other com-
pany, all within a single interface, essentially making it irrelevant which chat
service your friends use.2"4 These innovations occurred despite a mandate in the
conditions of Time Warner's acquisition of AOL that the post-merger firm
provides for IM interoperability.2" A short three years later, the provision was
quietly sunset because of its irrelevance. 56
A similar market response would almost certainly follow a move by Twitter
to exert excessive control over its APIs. In web 2.0 markets-that is, markets
built on pure code-the fixed costs of investment are orders of magnitude less
than they were with the massive physical networks of pipes and towers from
the era of analog broadcasting and communications. 57 Thus, major competition
for Twitter is more than possible, and it is likely to come from sources and
platforms that we are unable to currently imagine, just as few of us could have
imagined something like Twitter developing.
Even if some social media platform owners wanted to abandon previously
open APIs and move to a walled garden, there is no reason to classify such a
move as anticompetitive foreclosure or leveraging of the platform. 58 Market-
place experimentation in search of a sustainable business model should not be
made illegal.
Because most social media sites such as Twitter do not charge for the ser-
252 Thierer, Problem with API Neutrality, supra note 242.
253 Id.
254 See IM, Email, and Social Networks in One Easy To Use Application!, DIGSBY,
http://commcns.org/16LDp9W (last visited Apr. 13, 2013); see also ADIUM,
http://commcns.org/146sacx (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
255 Thierer, Problem with API Neutrality, supra note 242.
256 In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, % 326-28
(Jan. II, 2001) [hereinafter Time Warner-AOL Memorandum Opinion & Order],
http://commcns.org/l 3X06xw.
257 Thierer, Problem with API Neutrality, supra note 242.
258 Id.
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vices they provide, some limited steps to lock down their platforms or APIs
may help them earn a return on their investments by monetizing traffic on their
own platforms.259 If a social media provider had to live under a strict version of
Zittrain's API neutrality principle, however, it might be extremely difficult to
monetize traffic and increase businesses because the company would be forced
to share its only valuable intellectual property.26
In sum, if the government were to forcibly apply API neutrality or adverse
possession principles through utility-like regulation, it would send a signal to
social media entrepreneurs that their platforms are theirs in name only and
could be coercively commoditized once they are popular enough."' Such a
move would constitute a serious disincentive to future innovation and invest-
ment.262
B. Wu's Separations Principle
Wu's proposed "Separations Principle" for the information economy would
also have a profound impact on social media operators.263 In concrete regulato-
ry terms-and despite Wu's claim to the contrary," his approach most assur-
edly would require regulation-the Separations Principle would segregate in-
formation providers into three buckets: creators, distributors, and hardware
makers.265 Presumably these categories would become three of the new "titles"
(or regulatory sections) of a forthcoming Information Economy Separations
Act.
While conceptually neat, these classifications do not conform to our highly
dynamic digital economy, the parameters of which can change wildly within
the scope of just a few years. For example, Google cut its teeth in the search
and online advertising markets, but it now markets phones, travel services, tel-
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company, now sells pay TV services and a variety of wireless devices.267 AOL
reinvented itself as a media and advertising company after its brief reign as the
king of dial-up Internet access.26 Netflix focused exclusively on mail delivery
of movies before moving into electronic distribution.69 Similarly, at first, Am-
azon only sold books by mail.27 Now it is a diversified retailer of countless
goods and has moved into electronic publishing and distribution as well as the
digital device business with its Kindle. 7'
Should these firms have stayed put in their old sectors? Would firms that al-
ready possess integrated operations and investments (Microsoft, Apple, and
Amazon, for instance) be forced to divest control of them to comply with the
Separations Principle? If so, it would hinder integrative efficiencies and restrict
many potentially beneficial forms of technological innovation. Firms often
invest and innovate across market segments to lower costs, find new profit op-
portunities, and develop new products to serve existing or new customers.2
Wu's proposal would make many of these efforts illegal.
Wu shrugs off such concerns, stating that, "the Separations Principle accepts
in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be
sacrificed even in ways that may seem painful or costly. ''273 Such a flippant
attitude ignores not only the potential benefits of certain forms of integration,
but also the fact that his proposed information apartheid would upend the digi-
tal economy. It likely would require the breakup of dozens of technology com-
panies and many social media providers. Wu also ignores the litigation night-
mare that would ensue once the government started forcing divestitures.
Nor does Wu explain how the bureaucratic machinations and regulatory cap-
ture he decries would be held in check under his proposed regime. He states
that the "government [should] also keep its distance and not intervene in the
market to favor any technology, network monopoly, or integration of the major
functions of an information industry," but he does not explain how to accom-
plish this plan.74
Equally surprising is Wu's assertion that "[a] Separations regime would take
much of the guesswork and impressionism, and indeed the influence traffick-
267 Amy Chozick, Mobile Services and Cable TV Are Unexpected Allies, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2012), http://commcns.org/18iO3q9.
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ing, out of the oversight of the information industries."2"5 To the extent that his
Separations Principle eliminates "guesswork" and creates more regulatory cer-
tainty, it would do so only by creating rigid artificial barriers to market entry
and innovation across the information economy.
Who or what would enforce this new regulatory system? Wu does not offer
a detailed roadmap, but he indicates that some traditional regulatory bodies
would continue to have a role. Despite his admission that the FCC "has on oc-
casion let itself become the enemy of the good, effectively a tool of repres-
sion," Wu suggests that the agency will continue to have "day-to-day authority
over the information industries." '276 The FCC's current regulatory authority is
limited mostly to older sectors of the information economy (broadcasting and
telecommunications in particular),277 but Wu believes that its role should be
expanded, particularly through net neutrality mandates on information distribu-
tors.27
Nonetheless, Wu asserts that increased FCC oversight will not be enough.
Instead, he states that we need "not only an FCC institutionally committed to a
Separations Principle but also a structural arrangement to guard against such
deviations, including congressional oversight as well as attention and correc-
tions from other branches of government." '279 Here, the "breadth and ambition"
that Wu argues will be necessary to enforce his Separations Principle becomes
more apparent.2"' Layer upon layer of prophylactic regulation would be re-
quired under such a regime.
Creating firewalls between the classifications that Wu proposes would be
extraordinarily challenging and would demand incessant interventions to en-
sure that the walls are not breached. Regulatory line drawing would be mind-
bogglingly complex and costly, as each new information-sector innovation
would be subjected to a laborious classification proceeding.28" ' Yet, despite the
inefficiencies historically associated with such heavy-handed regulation, Wu
claims that this new regime will lead to more innovation and consumer choice
than Internet entrepreneurs have achieved during the last two decades.
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C. The Question of Property Rights in Platforms and Protocols
Zittrain, Wu, and other proponents of increased regulation of social media
have not yet offered a serious antitrust analysis of their proposals. Their pro-
posals offer an amalgam of traditional antitrust remedies, including structural
separation and nondiscriminatory access or network sharing.2 However, they
have moved right into the question of remedies without proving market failure
or showing consumer harm.
Modem antitrust law sets the bar for intervention much higher than these
scholars. Summarizing the Supreme Court's current antitrust jurisprudence,
Phillip Areeda notes that, "[t]here is no general duty to share. Compulsory ac-
cess, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional." '283 He goes on to ex-
plain why policymakers should be fundamentally skeptical of "essential facili-
ty" claims:
No one should be forced to deal unless doing so is likely substantially to
improve competition in the marketplace by reducing price or by increasing
output or innovation. Such an improvement is unlikely (a) when it would chill
desirable activity; (b) [when] the plaintiff is not an actual or potential competi-
tor; (c) when the plaintiff merely substitutes itself for the monopolist or shares
the monopolist's gains; or (d) when the monopolist already has the usual privi-
lege of charging the monopoly price for its resources .... Even when all these
conditions are satisfied, denial of access is never per se unlawful; legitimate
business purpose always saves the defendant.2"
It is difficult to see how or why any social media provider or platform would
be subject to essential facility or public utility classification or regulation on
the basis of these criteria.
Antitrust-specific analysis largely sidesteps the broader question of property
rights in social media platforms. Zittrain's suggestion that policymakers might
apply adverse possession principles to any digital platform with enough users
is, at root, a call to limit or even abolish property rights in digital platforms
once those platforms or devices gain popularity." 5 Whether forcing access to a
privately built social media platform constitutes unconstitutional taking of an
innovator's property rights remains an open question.286 Proponents of such
regulation might claim that regulation of a protocol is not the same as regula-
tion of a company's property. For most social media operators, however, this is
282 See ZirTRAN, supra note 9; see also WU, MASTER SWITCH, supra note 10, at 312.
283 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1990).
284 Id.
285 ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 183-84.
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[Vol. 21
Perils of Social Media as Public Utilities
a distinction without a difference. If Twitter, Google, Apple, Facebook, Ama-
zon, or any other social media platform were forced to surrender control of its
APIs to regulatory officials, this would significantly undermine the firm's right
and ability to control one of its most valuable assets-perhaps its only mone-
tizable asset. Because APIs and "protocols" can be and typically are subject to
intellectual property protection,287 whether copyright or patent, they are plainly
the property of their respective companies.
Wu's Separations Principle would also undermine companies' rights to their
most valuable assets. His plan would likely require the forcible disintegration
of information platforms and providers that operate in the three layers of the
information economy that Wu wants to keep strictly quarantined. For vertically
integrated companies such as Apple or Microsoft, this requirement would have
devastating ramifications. Indeed, for any social media operator or information
platform, being forced to divest assets or being structurally separated could
mean the loss of integrative efficiencies, core competencies, and important
product lines. Such breakups might also require companies to sacrifice crucial
intellectual property rights. 2"8 Finally, forcible disintegration could mean the
loss of a valued part of the firm's labor force, as well as a significant loss of
shareholder value. These losses constitute sound legal grounds for a "takings"
challenge under the Fifth Amendment.289
At a minimum, regulatory proponents should not be surprised when social
media operators begin to litigate these matters and lengthy legal wrangling
ensues. 2 Litigation would further limit innovation by the regulated entities and
others in the field, and would likely chill broader industry investment by both
the incumbent social media provider and its potential competitors.29 '
In sum, Zittrain's API neutrality regime and Wu's Separations Principle
mandate would upend the way much of the modem digital economy operates
and cripple many of America's most innovative companies and sectors. In the
long run, such changes have the potential to sacrifice America's current role as
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a global information technology leader.
VI. CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC, SCHUMPETERIAN CHANGE VS. THE
STATIC, ADMINISTRATIVE MINDSET
The debate over whether to treat social media platforms as utilities comes
down to a classic conflict of visions between the static and dynamic competi-
tion mindsets.292 Those who take static snapshots of markets are bound to imag-
ine that the popularity of some social media platforms over others constitutes
an intractable problem unlikely to be remedied by new entry or innovation.
By contrast, a dynamic view of market economies-especially markets built
on code-appreciates what economist Joseph Schumpeter famously called the
"perennial gales of creative destruction" that continuously blow through the
digital economy.293 Economist Jerry Ellig has explained that, in the Schumpet-
erian paradigm, "firms compete not on the margins of price and output, but by
offering new products, new technologies, new sources of supply, and new
forms of organization. Possession of market power is consistent with vigorous
competition, and many seemingly anticompetitive practices actually facilitate
innovation."2" The Schumpeterian paradigm and other dynamic competition
models best capture the nature of competition and innovation in today's digital
marketplace. Eric Goldman, a Santa Clara University law professor, has sum-
marized the dynamic nature of Internet competition and the problem with the
static mindset that dominates academic and policy discussions:
First, if we evaluate Internet competition only by taking a point-in-time
snapshot of existing competitors, we will probably fail to anticipate the identity
and business proposition of disruptive new entrants. Second, in a digital envi-
ronment with low switching costs between vendors, consumers will flock to
new entrants that solve their informational needs-even if the competitors of-
fer a very different solution. As a result, a dominant information provider in
one technological niche still faces significant cross-elasticities of demand from
providers in other technological niches.295
The Schumpeterian model explains why some online operators can gain
scale so rapidly only to stumble and fall with equal velocity. Digital-Davids are
292 Jerry Ellig & Daniel Lin, A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories, in DYNAMIC
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constantly displacing cyber-Goliaths. Social and economic risk-takers and in-
novators are constantly revolutionizing the digital economy and bringing about
equally seismic disruptions throughout our culture.2" New disruptions flow
from many unexpected quarters as innovators launch groundbreaking products
and services, while also devising new ways to construct cheaper and more effi-
cient versions of existing technologies.
It is during what some might regard as a market's darkest hour that some of
the most exciting, disruptive technologies and innovations develop. People do
not sit still; they respond to incentives, including short spells of apparently ex-
cessive private power. Moreover, when markets are built upon code rather than
expensive physical infrastructure, the pace and nature of change becomes unre-
lenting and utterly unpredictable.
The AOL case study is constructive in this regard. Just a decade ago, AOL
was cast as the great villain of online openness and was thought to possess an
unassailable position of digital dominance.297 For a time, it was easy to under-
stand why some may have been worried: "twenty five million subscribers were
willing to pay $20 per month to get a guided tour of AOL's walled-garden ver-
sion of the Internet.""29 Then AOL and media titan Time Warner announced a
historic megamerger that had some critics, such as Norman Soloman and Rob-
ert Scheer, predicting the rise of "new totalitarianisms" and a corporate "Big
Brother." '299
Fearing the worst, the FTC and the FCC placed several conditions on the
merger. These included "open access" provisions that forced Time Warner to
offer the competing ISP service of the second largest ISP at the time (Earth-
Link) before it made AOL's service available across its largest cable divi-
sions."° Another FCC-imposed provision mandated interoperability of instant
messaging systems based on the fear that AOL was poised to monopolize that
296 "Schumpeterian competition is primarily about active, risk-taking decision makers
who seek to change their parameters," note economists Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin. "It is
about continually destroying the old economic structure from within and replacing it with a
new one." Ellig & Lin, supra note 292, at 18-19.
297 See Joe Wilcox, Apple Is the new AOL and new Microsoft; and Whoa that Can't Be a
Good Thing, BETANEWS (June 1, 2010), http://commcns.org/1 fheVL7.
298 Adam Thierer, The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2: Saving the Net from Its
Supporters, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE, supra note 58, at 139, 150; see Nathan
DeSelm, Facebook Is The New AOL: How Marketing Missteps Will Destroy the World's
Most Popular Social Network, VILLING &. COMPANY (June 2, 2010),
http://commcns.org/l aNh IVf.
299 Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling the Faithful to Their Knees, FAIR.ORG
(Jan. 13, 2000), http://commcns.org/16OIYYE; Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-
Columnist, ONLINE JOURNALISM REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2000), http://commcns.org/ldkOGqh.
300 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger With





Despite all the tension and regulatory worry, the merger quickly went off the
rails and AOL's online "dominance" quickly evaporated.3 2 By April 2002, just
two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had reported a stagger-
ing $54 billion loss. 3 By January 2003, its losses had grown to nearly $99 bil-
lion. 4 By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name
altogether, and the deal continued to slowly unravel.3"5 In a 2006 interview with
the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously de-
clared the death of merger "synergy" and went so far as to call synergy a
"bullsh*t" theory.3" In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL's dial-
up service,307 and in 2009, it spun off AOL entirely.30 Further deconsolidation
followed for Time Warner, which spun off its cable TV unit and various other
properties.3 9 Looking back at the deal in 2009, Fortune magazine Senior Edi-
tor Allan Sloan called it the "turkey of the decade."31
The concern about AOL's threat to monopolize instant messaging proved
particularly unfounded. Consumers have access to multiple IM services that
can be integrated into a single interface. In a truly Schumpeterian sense, inno-
vators came in and disrupted AOL's plans with innovative offerings that few
critics or regulators would have believed possible just a decade ago.
The AOL case study proves that even the mightiest of tech titans can stum-
ble and fall-and in very short order. There is no reason to believe that such
dynamic, disruptive change will not continue in the social media arena.3"'
Many social media platforms exist; each one neither unique nor essential. Es-
301 Time Warner-AOL Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 256, 129-131.
302 Adam Thierer, A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner
to Comcast-NBC, PROGRESS ON POINT, Dec. 2009, at 2, available at
http://commcns.org/l 8YLfAF.
303 Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner's $54 Billion Loss Means, TIME (Apr. 25,
2002), http://commcns.org/19XkOQm.
304 Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 Billion, CNETNEwS (Jan. 30, 2003, 1:37
PM), http://commcns.org/19XkQb0.
305 Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNETNEWS (Sept. 18, 2003,
10:58 AM), http://commcns.org/IdMKQ80.
306 Matthew Kamitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says
Enough, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2006), http://commcns.org/I 8iVXzP.
307 Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL's Dial-Up Service,
N.Y.TMES (Feb. 7, 2008), http://commcns.org/17kiDkc.
308 Press Release, Time Warner, Time Warner Inc. Completes Spin-Off of AOL Inc.
(Dec. 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://commcns.org/l 5fclXb.
309 Frank Ahrens, Time Warner To Spin Off Cable, WASH. POST (May 1, 2008),
http://commcns.org/182rFm5.
310 Allan Sloan, Deals: The Financial World's Turkeys of the Year, WASH. POST (Nov.
17, 2009), http://commcns.org/l 7hZjGe.
311 John F. Blevins, Meet the New Scarcity: A First Amendment Framework for Regulat-
ing Access to Digital Media Platforms, BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS, August 2011, at 43.
I Vol. 21
20131 Perils of Social Media as Public Utilities 297
cape from any of them is reasonably easy. Barriers to entry by new firms are
low. Innovation continues at a healthy clip.
It is significant to note that this industry realm is still so novel that is re-
mains unnamed. Social media is a very broad term, and one that is constantly
morphing. As a result, it is necessary to be skeptical of calls for a preemptive
regulatory strike. It is essential to have a little faith in the entrepreneurial spirit
and the dynamic nature of markets built upon code, which have the uncanny
ability to evolve and upend incumbent "tech titans" seemingly every few years.
Keeping these insights in mind, analysts and policymakers should avoid
casually affixing "public utility" or "essential facility" labels to today's dy-
namic social media platforms. In essence, public utility regulation is a declara-
tion of surrender on competition. There is no reason to raise the white flag on
social media innovation. Progress continues.
